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DEMOCRACY, BUREAUCRACY, AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 
LAUREN M. OUZIEL* 
Abstract: American criminal justice systems blend elected or politically appointed leaders 
with career civil servants. This organizational hybrid creates challenges at the intersection of 
democratic accountability and enforcement discretion. In moments of stasis in the politics of 
criminal justice, those challenges are largely invisible: the public, elected officials, and civil 
servants generally share a unity of interest, borne of like-minded policy commitments that 
have developed over time. But in moments of political transition—that is, when public pref-
erences on criminal justice policy are in flux—the relationship between bureaucracy and 
democracy can be fraught. Public demand for change may or may not accord with the com-
mitments, ideals, and culture of the bureaucracy’s front-line actors. Elected leaders are voted 
in with high expectations for transformative change, but may be stymied by institutional re-
sistance to it. The bureaucracy, in turn, may seek to alter the political narrative that is fueling 
the political transition, further complicating the democratic process. And in a system in 
which criminal lawmaking and enforcement power is spread across three different levels of 
government—local, state, and federal—with overlapping authority yet different constituen-
cies, the complexity of interplay between “public” and bureaucracy deepens.  
Across America, a growing number of jurisdictions are entering moments of political transi-
tion in criminal justice. This Article explores the political and institutional arrangements that 
alternatively impede, permit, or even accelerate a resulting change in criminal enforcement 
on the ground. Drawing on the democracy/bureaucracy framework developed in the fields of 
political theory and public administration, the Article considers how these fields and others 
can enrich our understanding of current political and institutional dynamics in American 
criminal justice. The Article then reflects on these dynamics’ implications for democratic re-
sponsiveness and systemic legitimacy, arguing, counterintuitively, that the very features of 
the democracy/bureaucracy relationship capable of slowing democratically sanctioned 
change in criminal enforcement can also end up hastening political shifts; and that, properly 
leveraged, the criminal enforcement bureaucracy can help realize deliberative and participa-
tory democratic ideals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Public attitudes towards crime and punishment are in flux. Voters have 
passed state referenda reducing prison terms, decriminalizing certain offenses, 
strengthening police oversight, and re-enfranchising convicted felons.1 They 
have pushed mayors to commit to police reform, both with respect to who is 
policed and how they are policed.2 Prosecutorial elections over the last several 
cycles have seen candidates increasingly campaigning—and winning—on plat-
forms of reforming bail, charging, and plea-bargaining practices.3 And alt-
hough these electoral outcomes and pressures have yet to gain broad traction, 
neither are they geographically or culturally limited: they have touched juris-
dictions from north to south and from east to west, from major cities to rural 
counties, and from more punitive regions to more merciful ones.4 These results 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Daniel Gotoff & Celinda Lake, Voters Want Criminal Justice Reform. Are Politicians Lis-
tening?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/11/13/
voters-want-criminal-justice-reform-are-politicians-listening [https://perma.cc/RU7H-YXXV] (sum-
marizing a series of criminal justice reforms passed by voters in 2018 elections); Nicole D. Porter, The 
State of Sentencing 2014: Developments in Policy and Practice, SENTENCING PROJECT (Feb. 1, 2014), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/the-state-of-sentencing-2014-developments-in-policy-
and-practice [https://perma.cc/U8EW-6ZMF] (describing voter initiatives that decriminalized specific 
crimes). 
 2 See JR Ball, Baton Rouge Mayor Vows Police Reform Despite Justice Department Changes, 
NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nola.com/archive/article_4681177c-
b09e-5af0-b2bf-ccb291ca315f.html [https://perma.cc/QL5N-NEY4] (detailing the Baton Rouge 
mayor’s campaign promises and plans to enhance the police department’s relationship with the pub-
lic); Lynh Bui & Peter Hermann, Baltimore Mayor, Police Commissioner Pledge to Move Forward on 
Reform Efforts, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/
baltimore-police-commissioner-pledges-reform-despite-justice-dept-action/2017/04/04/5b745ce8-
b88b-4b5e-a14b-4f9f84376168_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a63a8328f3d3 [https://perma.
cc/G8RL-BG3Q] (relaying the Baltimore mayor’s public remarks on continued efforts to reform the 
city’s police department); Mayor Rahm Emanuel, Our Next Steps on Road to Police Reform, CHI. SUN 
TIMES (May 13, 2016), https://chicago.suntimes.com/opinion/mayor-emanuel-our-next-steps-on-road-
to-police-reform/ [https://perma.cc/Z5VW-7MKD] (pledging to improve accountability in the Chica-
go Police Department); Maura Ewing, A Reckoning in Philadelphia, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 3, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/a-reckoning-in-philadelphia/472092/ [https://
perma.cc/4MH6-TLCF] (making note of the Philadelphia mayor’s claims that he seeks to reduce in-
carceration rates and address the cash bail issue). 
 3 David Alan Sklansky, The Changing Political Landscape for Elected Prosecutors, 14 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 647, 650 (2017); Maurice Chammah, These Prosecutors Campaigned for Less Jail Time—
And Won, MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/11/09/these-
prosecutors-campaigned-for-less-jail-time-and-won#.Rj6p3Dhd8 [https://perma.cc/B9VD-CRDE]; 
Daniel Nichanian, Voters Beyond Big Cities Rejected Mass Incarceration in Tuesday’s Elections, THE 
APPEAL (Nov. 7, 2019), https://theappeal.org/politicalreport/voters-beyond-big-cities-rejected-mass-
incarceration-in-tuesdays-elections/ [https://perma.cc/H952-SD9T] (describing a “wave of decarceral 
candidates” emerging victorious in prosecutor races across the country in 2019). 
 4 See Ben Austen, In Philadelphia, a Progressive D.A. Tests the Power—and Learns the Limits—
of His Office, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/30/magazine/
larry-krasner-philadelphia-district-attorney-progressive.html [https://perma.cc/5ZE8-9LN3] (“[B]egin-
 
526 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:523 
also accord with national public opinion polls over the last several years show-
ing strong public support for reducing incarceration for non-violent offenses, 
reforming the bail system, and increasing police oversight and accountability.5 
A Congress that has struggled to achieve bipartisan legislative achievements 
recently passed, by a wide bipartisan margin, a federal criminal justice reform 
bill that, among other things, reduces (or in some cases eliminates) mandatory 
minimum penalties for certain offenses and offenders and improves conditions 
of confinement.6 Though modest in its reforms, the legislation adds to the ac-
cumulating evidence of a changing politics of crime. 
                                                                                                                           
ning in 2013, when the late Ken Thompson unseated a 23-year incumbent in Brooklyn, voters have 
elected 30 reform-minded prosecutors, in municipalities as varied as Corpus Christi, Kansas City and 
San Francisco.”); Justin Miller, The New Reformer DAs, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 2, 2018), http://
prospect.org/article/new-reformer-das [https://perma.cc/HFR4-PGDN] (stating that reform-oriented 
prosecutors have won office in Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, New Mexico, Colorado, and 
Illinois); Joseph Neff, How Prosecutor Reform Is Shaking Up Small DA Races, MARSHALL PROJECT 
(May 1, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/05/01/how-prosecutor-reform-is-shaking-up-
small-da-races?ref=collections [https://perma.cc/BYK4-LFWU] (arguing that reform platforms among 
prosecutors running in Philadelphia, Chicago, and Houston have now spread to Durham, North Caro-
lina as well); Nichanian, supra note 3 (describing victories for progressive prosecutors in 2019 in rural 
and suburban districts in Virginia, Mississippi, and Pennsylvania). 
 5 See RICH MORIN ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., BEHIND THE BADGE: AMID PROTESTS AND 
CALLS FOR REFORM, HOW POLICE VIEW THEIR JOBS, KEY ISSUES AND RECENT FATAL ENCOUNTERS 
BETWEEN BLACKS AND POLICE 75, 81 (Jan. 11, 2017), https://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/
uploads/sites/3/2017/01/06171402/Police-Report_FINAL_web.pdf (surveying 4,538 adults and 
finding sixty percent of the public, including a majority of whites, believes deaths of blacks during 
police encounters in recent years are signs of a broader problem); PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICA’S 
CHANGING DRUG POLICY LANDSCAPE 1 (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/
uploads/sites/4/legacy-pdf/04-02-14-Drug-Policy-Release.pdf (surveying 1,821 adults and finding 
67% favored treatment over prosecution for those who use cocaine and heroin, and 63% favored states 
moving away from mandatory drug penalties); Black, White, and Blue: Americans’ Attitudes on Race 
and Police, ROPER CTR. FOR PUB. OPINION RESEARCH (Sept. 22, 2015), https://ropercenter.cornell.
edu/blog/black-white-and-blue-americans-attitudes-race-and-police [https://perma.cc/AG55-L6ZM] 
(reviewing a variety of recent polls by major mainstream news outlets and finding that large majorities 
of both whites and blacks support investigations of police misconduct by outside, independent prose-
cutors, better training for police on civilian confrontations, public videotaping of police/citizen en-
counters, and use of police bodycams); Gotoff & Lake, supra note 1 (“[S]olid majorities of voters 
support major reform of the criminal justice system in the United States (57 percent), including nearly 
one-in-five voters (19 percent) who support a complete overhaul of the system. This sentiment crosses 
partisan lines, too, with majorities of Democrats (64 percent) and independents (58 percent) and near-
ly half of all Republicans (48 percent) backing the call for major reform of the criminal justice sys-
tem.”); New Survey: With Increased Understanding of Current Practices, Americans Support Reforms 
to Pretrial and Money Bail Systems, CHARLES KOCH INST. (July 12, 2018), https://www.charleskoch
institute.org/news/new-survey-americans-support-reforms-pretrial-money-bail-systems/ [https://perma.
cc/M4AW-EX5L] (surveying 1,400 registered voters and finding 57% favor ending cash bail for those 
who cannot afford it in all but the most extreme circumstances and 72% favor limiting time in pretrial 
detention for those who cannot afford bail). 
 6 See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194; John Wagner & Philip Rucker, 
House Backs Bipartisan Criminal Justice Overhaul, Sends Bill to Trump, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/house-backs-bipartisan-criminal-justice-overhaul-
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To be sure, significant change in who and how many are policed, charged, 
and imprisoned will require deeper adjustments in public views, particularly 
with respect to violent offenders.7 Still, it is not too early to begin asking the 
critical next questions: how responsive is the criminal justice enforcement ap-
paratus to changes in public preferences, and how responsive should it be? Or, 
to put the question more broadly: what is, and what should be, the relationship 
between democracy and bureaucracy in American criminal justice? 
The relationship is complex. The thousands of criminal justice systems 
that collectively comprise American criminal justice exist within, and are sub-
ject to, both democratic and bureaucratic processes. Comparative work tends 
to highlight the extent to which American criminal justice is relatively un-
bureaucratic, at least as compared to democracies with inquisitorial criminal 
justice systems.8 That it is. But strong bureaucratic elements exist here, too. 
Chief prosecutors (local district attorneys and state attorneys general) are 
mostly elected; but they take the reins of an office filled with career civil serv-
ants, many of whom began their careers long before the election and will re-
main long after. Police commissioners are appointed by elected mayors, and 
sheriffs are elected; but they lead departments of career law enforcement offic-
ers. And on the federal side, the chief law enforcement officer of the nation and 
                                                                                                                           
sends-bill-to-trump/2018/12/20/111e57e2-0448-11e9-b6a9-0aa5c2fcc9e4_story.html [https://perma.
cc/V76U-C74R]. The First Step Act’s penalty-reduction measures are relatively modest: it makes 
retroactive a 2010 amendment to penalties for distribution of crack cocaine, expands safety-valve 
eligibility (allowing certain drug offenders to be sentenced below the otherwise-applicable mandatory 
minimum), reduces mandatory minimum penalties for certain recidivist drug offenders, and eliminates 
a steep penalty increase that applied to defendants charged with multiple counts of using a firearm in 
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime or crime of violence. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIRST 
STEP ACT (Feb. 2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/newsletters/2019-special_
FIRST-STEP-Act.pdf (summarizing the sentencing reforms of the First Step Act of 2018). Still, the 
law accomplished the most significant federal penalty reductions in a generation, and its passage and 
title—implying the start of something more—reflects a widening political space for de-incarceration 
reform. See id.; see also Maggie Astor, Left and Right Agree on Criminal Justice: They Were Both 
Wrong Before, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/16/us/politics/criminal-
justice-system.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/6D25-9AQ9] (describing criminal jus-
tice reform proposals laid out by politicians and political activists from both left and right in a 2019 
Brennan Center report, which collectively “show how profoundly the debate has changed,” revealing 
“a wholesale reversal of [the] bipartisan consensus” on criminal enforcement). 
 7 See JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO 
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 185–86 (2017) (arguing that politicians and reformers focus mostly on re-
ducing penalties for nonviolent crimes but need to seek reforms for violent crimes to achieve real 
progress). 
 8 See, e.g., Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1413 
(2010); Michael Tonry, Prosecutors and Politics in Comparative Perspective, 41 CRIME & JUST. 1 
(2012); cf. Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Worldwide Accountability Deficit for Prosecu-
tors, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1587 (2010) (highlighting both the differences and similarities in forms 
of prosecutorial accountability between the U.S. election-based system and civil law bureaucratic 
systems). 
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of each district is appointed by the democratically elected President; but they 
lead thousands of attorneys who spend their careers within the Department of 
Justice (DOJ). 
Ours is a blended system. This Article explores its fault lines at a moment 
of political transition. I use the term “political transition” to describe a period 
in which public preferences on criminal justice policy are shifting, causing 
palpable electoral effects—not radically, and not everywhere, but to a degree 
and across a sufficient number and diversity of jurisdictions that serious ob-
servers can reasonably describe as new political trends.9 Whether these trends 
mark a short-term or longer-term shift remains to be seen. I use the term “tran-
sition” here to describe the present, not predict the future (or, with limited ex-
ceptions, to recall the past).10 For now, at least, the “one-way ratchet” towards 
severity that once defined the politics of crime in America no longer applies 
uniformly.11 
But shifts in the politics of criminal justice, even those that yield change 
to penal laws, may not translate into changes in enforcement practices. How 
and why they do, or do not, is the key puzzle our blended system presents. In 
the face of changing public preferences on criminal justice, how do current 
political and institutional arrangements enable or impede change in law-on-
the-ground? 
To begin to unpack this question, this Article takes on three primary tasks. 
The first is to highlight the absence of answers in the last several decades of 
scholarship, which by and large has charted the relationship between democra-
cy and the criminal enforcement bureaucracy in an era of nearly uniform penal 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See, e.g., David Cole, The Changing Politics of Crime and the Future of Mass Incarceration, in 
1 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTRODUCTION AND CRIMINALIZATION 13, 13 (Erik Luna ed., 
2017) (“For too many years, it seemed that the only possible stance a politician could take on crime 
was to be tougher than his opponent. . . . Today, however, ‘smart on crime’ has replaced ‘tough on 
crime.’ Rather than simply being tougher than the next guy, politicians and government officials in-
creasingly seek solutions that are based on evidence and reason rather than heated rhetoric and dema-
goguery.”); James Forman, Jr., Justice Springs Eternal, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/03/25/opinion/sunday/justice-springs-eternal.html [https://perma.cc/HZ3R-5D5J] 
(observing that, after fifty years of tough-on-crime politics, a “movement for a more merciful criminal 
justice system” is “stronger than ever” as evidenced by the results of local prosecutor elections and 
state referenda in numerous jurisdictions in 2016); Sklansky, supra note 3, at 650 (surveying a number 
of recent elections in which the electorate chose reform-oriented prosecutors over more traditional 
ones). 
 10 See infra notes 139–142 and accompanying text (describing reactions by career enforcers dur-
ing the earlier shift to harsher sentencing regimes). 
 11 See David Michael Jaros, Perfecting Criminal Markets, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1947, 1960 & 
n.57 (2012) (“Scholars have long observed that the criminal law seems to act as a ‘one-way ratchet’ 
perpetually expanding its scope and enhancing its penalties.”) (footnote omitted) (citing Erik Luna, 
The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 719 (2005); William J. Stuntz, The 
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 547 (2001)). 
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severity. The second is to identify the starting points of an updated inquiry: the 
key features of electoral politics, enforcement agency dynamics, and federal-
ism that can hasten or slow political transition in criminal justice and exacer-
bate or mitigate its effects. The third task is to consider the implications of cur-
rent institutional and political arrangements for democratic responsiveness and 
systemic legitimacy. In particular, I explore whether bureaucratic resistance in 
the criminal justice space is necessarily anti-democratic, or whether it is—or 
can be—a feature of democratic criminal justice. 
Updating our assessment of the relationship between democracy and the 
criminal enforcement bureaucracy raises a subset of new questions, among 
them: 
• How does the composition of the “public”—which varies both by juris-
diction and level of government (local, state, federal)—and the influences 
on voter choice affect elected leaders’ responsiveness in matters of crimi-
nal enforcement? 
• How do the incentives and interests of elected leaders on the one hand, 
career enforcers on the other, and the interaction of the two affect the way 
voters’ choices are translated down through enforcement bureaucracies? 
• How do vertical bureaucratic arrangements (i.e., those between federal, 
state, and local enforcers) within the criminal justice arena alternatively 
fuel or stymie shifts in public preferences? 
These questions go to the heart of a tension long observed in the democ-
racy/bureaucracy relationship. Max Weber first conceptualized democracy’s 
dependence on bureaucracy to implement democratically chosen policies, and 
the tax on democracy this dependence exacts.12 This tension has generated rich 
inquiry in the fields of organizational sociology,13 political theory,14 public 
administration,15 and administrative law.16 But scholars of criminal justice ad-
ministration have yet to fully mine its implications for criminal justice reform. 
                                                                                                                           
 12 FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 224–26 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & 
trans., 1958) (1946) (observing that “bureaucratization in the state administration itself is a parallel 
phenomenon of democracy,” yet one that ultimately exacts a “leveling of the governed in opposition 
to the ruling and bureaucratically articulated group, which in its turn may occupy a quite autocratic 
position, both in fact and in form”). 
 13 See, e.g., PETER M. BLAU, THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRACY: A STUDY OF INTERPERSONAL 
RELATIONS IN TWO GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 249, 250–65 (1963) (asking “[h]ow . . . a democratic 
society assure[s] that the direction and speed of changes in its bureaucracies conform to the common 
interest, regardless of the personal ideals and interests of their members?” and concluding the “para-
dox” of democracy and bureaucracy “is the crucial problem of our age”). 
 14 See generally KENNETH J. MEIER & LAURENCE J. O’TOOLE, JR., BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMO-
CRATIC STATE 21–26 (2006) (surveying the literature). 
 15 See id. at 26–30 (surveying the literature). 
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That is because the literature straddling democratic theory and criminal 
justice administration over the last half-century has been captivated by a par-
ticular political narrative, of overly punitive voting majorities and a criminal 
enforcement bureaucracy eager to do their bidding. Whether scholars have ap-
proached democracy and bureaucracy in criminal justice more from the former 
side17 or the latter,18 or even right down the middle,19 the focus has been al-
most exclusively on those aspects of the relationship that increase penal severi-
ty.20 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See generally Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 
1 (1982) (discussing the implications for political accountability of lawmaking delegation to agen-
cies); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984) 
(critiquing how the fields of administrative law and corporate law have treated the bureaucra-
cy/democracy tension). 
 17 See generally MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS (2016) (focusing on the American political system’s appetite for heavy criminal 
enforcement); MICHAEL O’HEAR, THE FAILED PROMISE OF SENTENCING REFORM (2017) (same); 
DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE (2008) (same); Nicola Lacey, American 
Imprisonment in Comparative Perspective, DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 102 (same); Samuel Walker, 
Governing the American Police: Wrestling with the Problems of Democracy, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
615, https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1577&context=uclf [https://
perma.cc/XQT7-PCDC] (same). 
 18 See generally Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Designed to Fail: The President’s Deference to 
the Department of Justice in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 387 
(2017) (discussing the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) influence on federal crime policy). A large 
chunk of the policing literature focuses on organizational challenges. See, e.g., Avlana K. Eisenberg, 
Incarceration Incentives in the Decarceration Era, 69 VAND. L. REV. 71, 93 (2016) (arguing that 
those with a stake in the prison industry are currently incentivized to favor high imprisonment); Ste-
phen D. Mastrofski & James J. Willis, Police Organization Continuity and Change: Into the Twenty-
First Century, 39 CRIME & JUST. 55 (2010) (collecting the literature); Marcia L. McCormick, Our 
Uneasiness with Police Unions: Power and Voice for the Powerful?, 35 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 
47, 54–59 (2015) (noting that police unions may impede reform measures and general accountability). 
 19 See generally STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2015) (ascribing 
America’s penal severity in part to an escalating cycle in which “insiders”—the criminal justice pro-
fessionals, including prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges—operate largely without public input, 
invoking attempts by “outsiders”—the general voting public—to constrain insiders’ discretion 
through harsh penal laws, the evasion of which by insiders in turn invokes even harsher legislative 
response); Daniel Richman, Institutional Coordination and Sentencing Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2055 
(2006) (discussing challenges of head prosecutors in implementing uniform sentencing policies in the 
post-Booker age); Stuntz, supra note 11 (exploring how a unity of interest between politicians and 
prosecutors, particularly in the federal system, generated harsher penalties in the latter quarter of the 
20th century). 
 20 Darryl Brown’s work has challenged the dominant narrative, at least as respects criminaliza-
tion. See generally Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223 (2007) 
[hereinafter Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization]; Darryl K. Brown, Prosecutors and Over-
criminalization: Thoughts on Political Dynamics and a Doctrinal Response, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
453 (2009) [hereinafter Brown, Prosecutors and Overcriminalization]. But Brown distinguishes crim-
inalization from punishment, arguing that although certain features of the democratic process have 
reduced or kept in check the scope of substantive criminal law over time, the law of punishment has 
become more severe. See Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, supra, at 267–68. Increasingly, 
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The prescriptions for this arrangement (or “pathology,” as Bill Stuntz fa-
mously described it) have varied.21 Some scholars call for broadening forms of 
public input, through extra-electoral mechanisms22 or redistricting.23 Others 
call for de-emphasizing the role of politics in criminal justice by giving greater 
power to courts and experts.24 Collectively, though, these accounts have paid 
scant attention to two increasingly urgent questions. First, can voting majori-
ties within the existing political structure ratchet down criminal enforcement?25 
Second, are enforcement institutions, comprised of politically accountable en-
forcement leaders and career civil servants, responsive to political change?26 
To be sure, until very recently such inattention was justified. In moments 
of stasis in the politics of criminal justice, political accountability and en-
forcement discretion may operate largely in tandem. A given jurisdiction’s vot-
                                                                                                                           
though, legislatures are ratcheting down punishment, raising new questions about the political dynam-
ics of punishment and its relationship to enforcement discretion. 
 21 See generally Stuntz, supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 22 See Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391, 407–27 (2016) (arguing for 
greater direct public oversight of police through video recordings of police/citizen interactions); Wil-
liam J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 2034–39 (2008) (arguing for giving greater 
power to local juries). Another line of scholarship in this vein seeks to democratize criminal justice 
professionals’ decision making by requiring that such decisions be made publicly and ex-ante, through 
legislation or notice-and-comment rulemaking. See generally Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos 
Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2012); Barry Friedman & Maria 
Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827 (2015). 
 23 See PFAFF, supra note 7, at 214–16 (arguing for re-zoning of prosecutorial districts to give 
greater political power to urban constituencies); Stuntz, supra note 22, at 2002–03 (linking the rise in 
criminalization and harsh penalties to the growing political clout of suburbs in metropolitan counties). 
 24 See RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS IN-
CARCERATION 2–6 (2019) (arguing for an institutional shift away from electoral politics to data-
driven, expert-based criminal justice decision making); Lacey, supra note 17, at 111 (arguing for a 
greater role of experts in setting criminal justice policies); Stuntz, supra note 11, at 587–98 (arguing 
for more robust constitutional review of criminal law); see also VANESSA BARKER, THE POLITICS OF 
IMPRISONMENT: HOW THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS SHAPES THE WAY AMERICA PUNISHES OFFEND-
ERS 10–13 (2009) (drawing connections between the severity of state penal regimes and the degree 
and form of lay participation versus expert input in penal policy). 
 25 Some recent work has explored voters’ agency in criminal justice reform. See generally PFAFF, 
supra note 7; Jonathan Simon, Beyond Tough on Crime: Towards a Better Politics of Prosecution, in 
PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY 250, 250–75 (Máximo Langer & Da-
vid Alan Sklansky eds., 2017); Sklansky, supra note 3. Yet these nascent discussions have not yet 
advanced to the next question: how criminal justice preferences registered at the ballot box get trans-
lated into enforcement changes on the ground. 
 26 Dan Richman has considered the challenges of executing a uniform sentencing policy when 
line-level prosecutors have so many discretionary tools to resist it. See Richman, supra note 19, at 
2065–69. Many others have considered what drives line-level prosecutors’ choices (though much 
work on this question remains to be done). See generally Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prose-
cution in 3-D, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1119 (2012); Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, 
Career Motivations of State Prosecutors, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1667 (2018). But there has been no 
focus on the interplay between the pressures and incentives of politically accountable leaders and 
those of line-level enforcers when political circumstances are in flux. 
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ers, elected officials, and civil servants generally share a unity of interest, 
borne of like-minded commitments that have developed over time.27 To the 
extent criminal justice outputs differ from public expectations, they are diffi-
cult to see—particularly in a system so opaque to begin with.28 
But at moments of political transition, the relationship can be fraught. 
Public demand for change may or may not accord with the commitments, ide-
als, and culture of the bureaucracy’s front-line actors. Elected leaders are voted 
in with high expectations for transformative change, yet may be stymied by the 
bureaucracy’s resistance to it. The bureaucracy, in turn, may seek to alter (or at 
least counter) the political narrative that is fueling the democratic transition, 
further complicating the democratic process. And in a system in which crimi-
nal lawmaking and enforcement power is spread across three different levels of 
government—local, state, and federal—with overlapping authority yet very 
different constituencies, the complexity of interplay between “public” and bu-
reaucracy deepens. 
These tensions have surfaced in recent years, sometimes dramatically. 
How is it, for instance, that though New York City’s mayor campaigned exten-
sively for his first term on a platform of police reform, few substantive reforms 
were operationalized in the years that followed?29 Why has bail reform stalled 
in jurisdictions where elected prosecutors campaigned on bail reform and have 
taken affirmative steps to achieve it?30 Amidst broad political support for cur-
                                                                                                                           
 27 See Stuntz, supra note 11, at 547–57 (describing a symbiotic relationship between lawmakers 
and prosecutors). 
 28 See generally Lauren M. Ouziel, Ambition and Fruition in Federal Criminal Law: A Case 
Study, 103 VA. L. REV. 1077 (2017) (exploring the disconnect between the publicly-expressed goals 
and prosecutorial outcomes of federal criminal laws, using federal drug enforcement as a case study of 
the phenomenon); Richman, supra note 19 (discussing the role of largely invisible pre-adjudicative 
decisions by police and prosecutors in the production of sentencing outcomes). 
 29 See J. David Goodman, De Blasio’s Police Reform Pledges May Burden His Re-election Bid, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/15/nyregion/de-blasios-police-reform-
pledges-may-burden-his-re-election-bid.html [https://perma.cc/6FYP-FKQW] (documenting dispari-
ties between De Blasio’s rhetoric and actual change on the ground, a situation described by a former 
employee in the Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice as, “[y]ou have this really exciting rhetoric of 
reform that has been embraced by almost everyone, including the police and prosecutors . . . [b]ut in 
practice, it’s business as usual”); Gloria Pazmino, De Blasio Facing Consternation on the Left for 
Silence on NYPD, POLITICO (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall/
story/2018/12/13/de-blasio-facing-consternation-on-the-left-for-silence-on-nypd-746345 [https://perma.
cc/V9HP-HFBD] (describing police accountability as “a central tenet in [De Blasio’s] ‘tale of two 
cities’ [campaign] message”). 
 30 See, e.g., RECLAIM CHI. ET AL., CREATING A CULTURE OF FAIRNESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY: 
DEFENSE ATTORNEYS REPORT ON KIM FOXX’S PROGRESS TOWARDS TRANSFORMING THE PRIORI-
TIES OF HER OFFICE 7 (Oct. 2019) [hereinafter DEFENSE ATTORNEYS REPORT ON KIM FOXX’S PRO-
GRESS], https://www.thepeopleslobbyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/2019-10-Report-Kim-
Foxx_ForPrint_FINAL.pdf (describing a mixed record on cash bond reduction in 2018 and 2019); 
RECLAIM CHI. ET AL., IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE FOR ALL: AN EVALUATION OF KIM FOXX’S FIRST 
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tailing long sentences for drug offenders in the federal system, did the Attorney 
General’s prosecutorial charging directive aimed to achieve that result erode 
democratic legitimacy, or enhance it?31 And did the line prosecutors subject to 
the directive effectuate or frustrate it—and why?32 
Unpacking these sorts of questions is a requisite to thoroughgoing, dura-
ble criminal justice reform. The reform literature in recent years has rightly 
focused on the need for voters and politicians to further adjust their attitudes 
about crime and punishment. But we risk the prospective gains from these ad-
justments if we do not address what happens, and what should happen, once 
they occur. This Article begins that task. 
It proceeds as follows. Part I tests the limits of the criminal justice reform 
literature, arguing that its nearly universal premise—of a uniformly punitive 
politics of crime—is outdated.33 Preferences on criminal justice among elec-
torates are more diverse than the standard accounts portray. We lack insight 
into how voting majorities and criminal enforcement bureaucracies, and lead-
ers and subordinates within those bureaucracies, interrelate within moments of 
political transition. Part II lays out those insights, examining the relationship 
between democracy and bureaucracy in criminal justice today across three 
vantage points: the public; the bureaucracy; and the sovereign.34 Part III re-
flects on the implications for democratic responsiveness and systemic legiti-
macy at a moment of political transition.35 I argue that the very features of the 
democracy/bureaucracy relationship capable of slowing democratically sanc-
                                                                                                                           
YEAR IN OFFICE 5–6 (Dec. 2017) [hereinafter EVALUATION OF KIM FOXX’S FIRST YEAR IN OFFICE], 
https://www.chicagoreader.com/general/201712/Equal_Justice_for_All_-_A_Report_on_Kim_Foxx_s
_First%20Year-ForWeb.pdf (observing that Foxx’s bail initiatives have been offered to only a small 
percentage of defendants); Aurelie Ouss & Megan T. Stevenson, Bail, Jail, and Pretrial Misconduct: 
The Influence of Prosecutors 3 (Jan. 19, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3335138 (in a pre-post study of effects of District Attorney Larry Krasner’s 
directive to prosecutors to cease requesting cash bail in certain categories of cases, finding no detecta-
ble effect on pre-trial detention, and nearly 40% of eligible cases continuing to receive monetary or 
supervisory release conditions); Neff, supra note 4 (discussing the disconnect between the Durham 
County District Attorney’s promises on reforming cash bail, and his ADAs’ position on bail in bond 
hearings). 
 31 See generally Memorandum on Department Policy on Charging Mandatory Minimum Sentenc-
es and Recidivist Enhancements in Certain Drug Cases from Eric Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, to the U.S. Att’ys & Assistant Att’y Gen. for the Criminal Div. (Aug. 12, 2013), https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/ag-memo-department-policypon-charging-
mandatory-minimum-sentences-recidivist-enhancements-in-certain-drugcases.pdf. 
 32 See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE DE-
PARTMENT’S IMPLEMENTATION OF PROSECUTION AND SENTENCING REFORM PRINCIPLES UNDER 
THE SMART ON CRIME INITIATIVE (June 2017) [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.], https://
oig.justice.gov/reports/2017/e1704.pdf. 
 33 See infra notes 36–57 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 58–208 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 209–271 and accompanying text. 
534 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:523 
tioned change in criminal enforcement can end up hastening political shifts; 
and that, properly leveraged, the criminal enforcement bureaucracy can help 
realize more deliberative and participatory democratic ideals. 
I. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM LITERATURE AND ITS LIMITS 
Criminal justice scholarship at the intersection of democracy and bureau-
cracy is plentiful, but limited in important respects. First, most accounts envi-
sion a uniform political dynamic across jurisdictions, in which the preferences 
of voting majorities interact with enforcement bureaucracies to produce ag-
gressive and punitive enforcement policies. Second, in considering the inter-
play of democracy and the enforcement bureaucracy, much of the literature 
elides the distinctions between the more politically accountable leaders of en-
forcement bureaucracies and their career-level employees. 
These limitations are important, because we are entering a period in 
which voting majorities in a number of jurisdictions are less punitive. Prescrip-
tions, then, need not only focus on ways to counterbalance majoritarian sys-
tems; they can, and should, consider also how to leverage electoral change. 
This Part reviews the literature at the intersection of democracy and bu-
reaucracy, categorizing it into two groups: (i) scholarship whose prescriptions 
focus primarily on the democracy side, advocating for altering the public’s role 
in criminal justice administration; and (ii) scholarship whose prescriptions fo-
cus primarily on the bureaucracy side, advocating organizational redesign of 
criminal justice institutions (police departments, prosecutors’ offices, and 
courts). This categorization is not to suggest two separate literatures. To the 
contrary, the work of a number of scholars straddles both. But the frame ena-
bles us to see how the dominant accounts of the last decades treat the challeng-
es of democracy on the one hand and bureaucracy on the other, and the limita-
tions that they both share. Section A of this Part surveys the first category,36 
and Section B the second.37 
A. Democracy-Focused Scholarship 
Criminal justice policy in the United States begins with democracy. Penal 
laws are enacted by elected legislators. Those laws are enforced on the streets 
by police departments, led by commissioners who are in turn appointed by 
elected mayors. The laws are enforced in the courts by line prosecutors who 
report to an elected or politically-appointed chief, and at the sentencing stage 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See infra notes 38–49 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 50–57 and accompanying text. 
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by judges, the vast majority of whom are elected and a minority of whom are 
politically appointed.38 
Befittingly, a large portion of the scholarly reform agenda focuses on the 
political economy of criminal enforcement. Some scholars highlight the im-
portance of changing how voters think about crime and punishment.39 Others 
advocate moving lawmaking and enforcement power away from majoritarian 
institutions (legislatures and elected prosecutors) to institutions such as juries, 
civilian review boards, or courts, which can protect and give voice to those 
with less political power.40 Some call for a devolution of lawmaking and en-
forcement power from federal, state, and geographically broad counties to 
more narrowly drawn “local” governments, in an effort to expand political 
power to under-represented communities.41 And a smaller group of scholars 
points to the advantages of placing crime policy in the hands of criminal jus-
tice professionals (sentencing commissions, advisory panels, and so on), re-
moved from the fever of majoritarian politics.42 
Although varied in its approaches to reform, this body of scholarship em-
phasizes the public’s role in constraining or enabling the excesses of legisla-
                                                                                                                           
 38 Chief prosecutors are elected in all jurisdictions except those in Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, 
and New Jersey (and, of course, the federal system). See Carissa Byrne Hessick & Michael Morse, 
Picking Prosecutors, 105 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 14–15) (on file with au-
thor). Judicial selection varies widely across states and even across jurisdictions within a state; never-
theless, thirty-nine states allow for direct voter input in selection of trial court judges at either the 
initial or retention stage. See Judicial Selection: An Interactive Map, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
http://judicialselectionmap.brennancenter.org/?court=Trial [https://perma.cc/8ZE5-2SWB]. 
 39 See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 17, at 2 (claiming that the biggest challenge in reducing high 
incarceration rates in the United States is making it a highly important issue for voters and changing 
the political system to be more reform oriented); O’HEAR, supra note 17, at 212 (stating that incarcer-
ation will only significantly decline once old public attitudes of severely punishing crime are 
changed); PFAFF, supra note 7, at 227–29 (arguing that changing U.S. citizens’ “attitudes toward 
crime” is the most important reform); Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 606–08 (2009) (urging different metrics by which voters could assess chief prose-
cutors). 
 40 See BIBAS, supra note 19, at 144–50 (advocating for increased citizen participation in local 
policing through avenues such as community review boards and community advocates positioned 
within police units and prosecutorial offices); Brown, Prosecutors and Overcriminalization, supra 
note 20, at 464 (suggesting that courts should take a larger role in supervising prosecutors by expand-
ing judicial doctrines); Simonson, supra note 22, at 407–27 (citing civilian copwatching as a method 
of increasing police accountability and public participation in policing); Stuntz, supra note 11, at 587–
98 (promoting the idea of greater judicial oversight over criminal law through active constitutional 
scrutiny). 
 41 See PFAFF, supra note 7, at 214–16 (calling for dividing prosecutorial offices into smaller urban 
and suburban zones so that citizens in areas with a lot of crime have more of a say in politics); see 
also Stuntz, supra note 22, at 2002–03 (explaining that in large county-wide prosecutorial offices, 
white suburban voters have had more voting power than minority urban voters). 
 42 See, e.g., BARKOW, supra note 24, at 2–6 (arguing for an institutional shift away from electoral 
politics to data-driven, expert-based criminal justice decision making); Lacey, supra note 17, at 111 
(arguing for a greater role for experts in setting criminal justice policies). 
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tures and criminal enforcers. Whether the prescription is a greater public role 
or a lesser one, or a reframing of who the public should be, the analysis mostly 
begins and ends there. That is, it begins by diagnosing features of the political 
economy that produce sub-optimal criminal enforcement, and it ends with a 
prescription for changing or constraining those features through a recalibration 
of the manner or degree of public input. Little consideration is given to how, 
upon recalibration, the enforcement rank-and-file will respond to, and execute, 
the policies that then emanate. 
That omission matters. First, the success record of the “democratiza-
tion”43 movement thus far has been decidedly mixed, in no small part due to 
the difficulties of translating change through the enforcement bureaucracy’s 
front-line actors. Consider the great embrace of “community policing” in the 
1990s. In the hands of many police departments, it turned into “order-
maintenance” and “quality-of-life policing”—philosophies that borrowed but 
ultimately stepped away from the community-based ideal.44 Civilian review 
boards have largely proven ineffective.45 And although “copwatching”—the 
practice in which citizens record police conduct in real time by video—has 
given voice to traditionally powerless groups, it has yet to result in tangible 
reform gains, in no small part because of police officers’ and departments’ re-
jection of and hostility to the practice.46 
Second, the political economy against which the public-facing criminal 
justice reform literature aligns is no longer a monolith. Local elections over the 
last several years have seen mayors and prosecutors campaigning and winning 
on promises of reforming criminal enforcement—in narrowly drawn urban 
                                                                                                                           
 43 I use this term in line with Joshua Kleinfeld’s use, as a broad-brush description of scholars 
generally seeking to inject greater community voice into criminal justice administration. See Joshua 
Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1367, 1397 (2017) (refer-
ring to a democratic criminal justice system as one that invites public participation and deliberation 
and is responsive to the common people). I recognize that not all self-identify with the term as used 
here. See, e.g., Tracey Meares, Policing and Procedural Justice: Shaping Citizens’ Identities to In-
crease Democratic Participation, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1525, 1526 (2017) (finding a role for experts 
and bureaucracy in a democratic criminal justice system). 
 44 See THE CHALLENGE OF COMMUNITY POLICING: TESTING THE PROMISES 294–95 (Dennis P. 
Rosenbaum ed., 1994) (collecting empirical studies showing mixed results of community policing 
programs in a number of jurisdictions); Seth W. Stoughton, Principled Policing: Warrior Cops and 
Guardian Officers, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 611, 627 (2016) (“Community policing has failed to 
live up to its promise because of definitional failures, implementation and evaluation failures, and, 
most importantly, cultural resistance within law enforcement.”). 
 45 See Rachel Moran, Ending the Internal Affairs Farce, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 837, 845 (2016) (not-
ing that civilian review of police departments has “[f]or the most part . . . met with limited success,” 
and postulating reasons for the shortcomings). 
 46 See Simonson, supra note 22, at 438–41 (discussing police hostility to copwatching, and argu-
ing in favor of a more open-minded approach on the part of police departments). 
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counties,47 suburban counties,48 and even in broadly drawn counties where 
suburban “collar” voters dilute the political power of urban constituencies.49 In 
these jurisdictions, existing political structures have generated changes to pe-
nal laws and enforcement leadership. And yet, in a number of those jurisdic-
tions, enforcement patterns are slow to follow suit. This is a puzzle un-
addressed by public-facing accounts. 
At the heart of that puzzle is an increasingly complex relationship be-
tween politics and the enforcement bureaucracy. As the last decade has seen 
growing public interest in some parts in mitigating penal severity and ratchet-
ing down enforcement in certain offense categories, it has also seen a widening 
divide between the enforcement bureaucracy’s leaders (elected or appointed) 
and its rank-and-file. The incentives of law enforcement and corrections officer 
unions, line prosecutors, and street cops are not always aligned with the elect-
ed or appointed leader of their department—particularly at moments of transi-
tion in public attitudes about crime and punishment. It is therefore difficult 
today to speak of “prosecutors” or “police” and their relationship with “legisla-
tors” and “voters.” Those relationships will vary markedly depending on which 
members of a prosecutor’s office or police department, and which elected rep-
resentatives and voting constituencies, one is talking about. 
B. Bureaucracy-Focused Scholarship 
American criminal justice may begin with democracy, but it is dispensed 
through bureaucracy. Politically accountable leaders helm our policy-making, 
policing, and prosecutorial institutions, but day-to-day justice is meted out by 
career enforcers who operate largely under the radar. Data exists on numbers 
and categories of arrests, charges, plea rates, conviction rates, and sentences 
imposed. Yet true indicators of the quality of justice—who police decline to 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Philadelphia and Brooklyn, both sites of recent victories by progressive prosecutors, are exam-
ples of so-called “consolidated city-counties,” in which the city’s and county’s borders are cotermi-
nous. See List of Consolidated City-County Governments, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, https://www.nlc.
org/list-of-consolidated-city-county-governments [https://perma.cc/9FS8-DUHF] (listing Philadelph-
ia, Pennsylvania and Brooklyn, New York as such). 
 48 See Chammah, supra note 3 (describing victories by reformist prosecutors in Hillsborough 
County, Florida, Harris County, Texas and the city-county of Denver, Colorado). 
 49 Both John Pfaff and the late Bill Stuntz use Cook County, Illinois as a primary example of 
districting that dilutes urban constituents’ political voice. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
Yet that did not prevent the ascendance of Cook County State’s Attorney Kim Foxx, who campaigned 
on bail reform, prosecution of police misconduct, approaching drug abuse through treatment rather 
than prosecution, increasing prosecutorial transparency, and reducing aggressive charging. See Micah 
Uetricht, The Criminal-Justice Crusade of Kim Foxx, CHI. READER (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.
chicagoreader.com/chicago/kim-foxx-bid-unseat-anita-alvarez-cook-county/Content?oid=21359641 
[https://perma.cc/J59Q-3HPR] (documenting Foxx’s campaign and some of her criminal justice policy 
positions). 
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arrest, how plea bargains are struck, what charges were declined or dropped, 
what evidence is disclosed or withheld, or how sentencing recommendations 
were made—remain largely invisible. Collectively, they are the product of dai-
ly decisions by hundreds of thousands of enforcers on the ground. 
How to better regulate these sorts of decisions is the worthy fixation of a 
large body of criminal reform scholarship. This scholarship, too, diagnoses an 
unhealthy relationship between majoritarian politics and the criminal enforce-
ment bureaucracy. But it focuses on redesigning enforcement institutions to 
check enforcers’ power.50 These scholars look to the role of courts,51 legisla-
tures,52 defense counsel,53 and the public54 in the governance of enforcement 
institutions, with the public less as a casualty of or solution to political failures 
(as in the democracy-focused scholarship) and more a feature of institutional 
design. (In this sense, one might loosely incorporate the procedural justice lit-
erature, with its focus on redesigning policing to enhance public trust.)55 
The focus on the design of enforcement institutions is a necessary com-
ponent of reform. But this literature, too, has limitations. First, its focus on 
governance at the institutional level tends, as does the democracy-focused lit-
erature, to bypass distinctions between institutional leadership and the rank-
and-file. There are noteworthy exceptions (though most are quite dated).56 And 
                                                                                                                           
 50 See, e.g., Barkow & Osler, supra note 18, at 456–73 (proposing changes to the federal execu-
tive branch so that presidents receive advice on criminal justice that is independent from DOJ prose-
cutors); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Ad-
ministrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 880, 895–97 (2009) (blaming the rise of federal prosecutors’ 
power in part on politics of crime, and arguing for more attention to institutional design of prosecu-
tors’ offices); Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforce-
ment Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 789–805 (1998) (discussing congressional constraints on 
federal enforcement discretion); Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the 
Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1482–84 (2008) (discussing the need to recalibrate sen-
tencing discretion as between prosecutors and courts). 
 51 See Stith, supra note 50, at 1493 (discussing the importance of courts in calibrating prosecuto-
rial power and discretion). 
 52 See Richman, supra note 50, at 789–805 (discussing congressional constraints on federal en-
forcement discretion). 
 53 See Barkow & Osler, supra note 18, at 467, 473 (advocating for more individuals with criminal 
defense backgrounds to be appointed within the DOJ and as federal judges). 
 54 See Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 22, at 34–37 (calling for public notice-and-comment 
procedures when creating sentencing policy); Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 22, at 1877 (ar-
guing for public input and rulemaking for police practices). 
 55 See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, From Harm Reduction to Community Engagement: Redefining the 
Goals of American Policing in the Twenty-First Century, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1537, 1549–54 (2017) 
(suggesting that police promote procedural justice to build trust with their communities). 
 56 There is, however, more recent scholarship available. See generally Richman, supra note 19; 
David Alan Sklansky & Monique Marks, The Role of the Rank and File in Police Reform, 18 POLIC-
ING & SOC’Y 1 (2008) (introducing a conference focused specifically on this topic). Empirical work in 
this area is decades old. See generally MICHAEL K. BROWN, WORKING THE STREET: POLICE DISCRE-
TION AND THE DILEMMAS OF REFORM (1988) (studying attitudes and decision making of street patrol 
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even the limited recent work in this area leaves tantalizing questions at the in-
tersection of political accountability, leadership, and line-level enforcement 
discretion. 
Second, this literature gives scant attention to the role of politics in insti-
tutional redesign. Yet significant change to the organization and overall ap-
proach of criminal enforcement institutions, or to the allocation of power 
among those institutions, will not come absent political pressure.57 Put differ-
ently: the organizational and institutional literature has offered great insight 
into how criminal justice institutions do operate and how they should operate; 
but it largely omits the essential question of how, in a blended democrat-
ic/bureaucratic system, operational change ultimately comes to pass. The 
omission made sense when voting majorities were unlikely to support changes 
designed to limit enforcers’ power. It may no longer. 
Criminal justice scholarship at the intersection of democracy and bureau-
cracy has offered important contributions. It has diagnosed the challenges of 
majoritarian criminal justice, as well as those of bureaucratic power and dis-
cretion. Yet it holds too monolithic a view of both politics and enforcers. The 
last decade’s shift in the politics of crime challenges standard accounts of how 
politics and the enforcement bureaucracy interact. Although that shift remains 
small, the difficulties in operationalizing relatively uncontroversial reforms lay 
bare the task ahead. It is time we think about how criminal justice institutions 
navigate moments of political transition, and how they should. 
                                                                                                                           
officers in three police departments in Southern California); LIEF H. CARTER, THE LIMITS OF ORDER 
(1974) (seminal study of failed efforts, in one California district, to systematize decision making by 
line prosecutors); ELIZABETH REUSS-IANNI, TWO CULTURES OF POLICING: STREET COPS AND MAN-
AGEMENT COPS (1983) (finding significant distinctions in professional culture between management 
and line officers in a two-year study of social organization in the New York City Police Department). 
 57 This is true, as well, of courts in the criminal context, as others have shown. See Corinna Bar-
rett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in the Criminal 
Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1368 (2004) (demonstrating the role of public opin-
ion in producing the Warren Court’s supposedly most “revolutionary” criminal procedure opinions); 
Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101 GEO. L.J. 113, 125–33 (2012) (drawing 
links between judicial constraint of death penalty and public opinion). Interestingly, the Court’s deci-
sions in Blakely v. Washington and United States v. Booker, which had the effect of reducing prosecu-
torial plea-bargaining power, came about only after a sustained period of falling crime rates and grow-
ing public concern about the extent of prosecutorial power. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
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II. DEMOCRACY AND BUREAUCRACY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
Democracy, as has been famously observed, is an essentially contested 
concept.58 The same might be said, to a lesser degree, of bureaucracy, which can 
take on very different forms depending on the field, level of government, and 
type of government institution. At the outset, then, some clarification is in order. 
By “democracy,” I refer to the processes by which voters within U.S. ju-
risdictions participate in the generation of criminal justice policy. That process 
is, of course, not a monolith; as political scientists and political sociologists 
have shown, variations in political structures and in the extent and nature of 
public involvement in the policy-making process account, at least in part, for 
variations in penal policy both horizontally59 and vertically.60 My focus in this 
Part is on one, narrow aspect of the policy-generation process: elections. Spe-
cifically, I explore how certain features of the electoral process (namely, inter-
est group formation and voter choice dynamics) differ vertically, and on how 
those differences in turn affect enforcement institutions’ political responsive-
ness.61 
My focus on electoral processes is not to suggest that democracy can or 
should be reduced to simple majoritarianism, or that other aspects of the dem-
ocratic process, such as lawmaking, appropriations, and other forms of policy-
generation, are any less influential. To the contrary, the normative claims ad-
vanced in Part III rest heavily on deliberative and participatory concepts of 
democracy, and on how those concepts can be realized in criminal justice be-
yond the electoral context.62 Nevertheless, I focus in this Part on elections be-
cause, in most instances, elections directly determine the leadership of a key 
(some would say the key) institutional actor in the criminal enforcement bu-
reaucracy—prosecutors63—and indirectly determine the leadership of local 
police departments and federal enforcement agencies. An assessment of the 
interaction between the “public” and the criminal enforcement bureaucracy, 
                                                                                                                           
 58 See David Collier et al., Essentially Contested Concepts: Debates and Applications, 11 J. POL. 
IDEOLOGIES 211, 222–28 (2006) (discussing scholarly applications of W.B. Gallie, Essentially Con-
tested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167 (1956), on the concept of democracy). 
 59 See BARKER, supra note 24 (linking differences between three states’ penal policies to differ-
ences in states’ political structures and political agency of states’ citizens). 
 60 See generally LISA L. MILLER, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE POLI-
TICS OF CRIME CONTROL (2008) (linking differences between federal, state, and local penal policies to 
differences in interest groups’ roles in the legislative process at each level of government). 
 61 Thus, my agenda differs from Miller’s in that I focus on vertical differences’ effects on elec-
toral choice, whereas Miller focuses on their effects on the legislative process. See id. 
 62 See infra Part III. 
 63 See PFAFF, supra note 7, at 133 (naming prosecutors as “the most powerful actors in the crimi-
nal justice system”). But see Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171, 191–
203 (2019) (arguing that prosecutors have less power over criminal justice outcomes than other insti-
tutional actors). 
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then, must begin by assessing how well elections today reflect public prefer-
ences on criminal enforcement and communicate those preferences to the en-
forcement bureaucracy. 
My use of the term “bureaucracy” here is shorthand for the members of 
law enforcement institutions—elected or politically appointed leaders on the 
one hand, and civil servants on the other—rather than the structure or organi-
zation of the institutions themselves. A member-centric approach attends to 
differences in how these two sets of actors perceive, interact with, and respond 
to changes in public preferences. It bridges two literatures: one on how the 
structure and organization of law enforcement bureaucracies influence enforcer 
behavior,64 and the other on how the interests and motivations of different in-
stitutional actors in the criminal enforcement ecosystem (police, prosecutors, 
defense attorneys, and judges) collectively create the criminal law on the 
ground.65 
Democracy and bureaucracy in criminal justice interact along three vec-
tors: the preferences expressed by the voting public; the response to those 
preferences within the institutions that enforce the criminal laws; and the rela-
tionship between the voting public and criminal enforcement institutions in a 
system of near-complete jurisdictional overlap and independence along the 
vertical (federal/state/local) axis. Section A considers the first vector;66 Section 
B the second;67 and Section C the third.68 
A. The Public 
Who is “the public” in criminal justice? The answer is more complex than 
a simple analysis of jurisdictional boundaries might indicate. Two factors 
unique to criminal justice make this so. 
First, crime and its enforcement affect communities, and groups of people 
within a single community, differently. Communities that are over-policed or 
under-secured (or both) have different concerns than communities that rarely 
feel crime and criminal enforcement up-close. Within a community affected by 
crime and its enforcement, some may perceive the need for greater enforce-
ment, while others feel enforcement should be dialed back, or perhaps refo-
                                                                                                                           
 64 See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF 
LAW & ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES (1978); Mastrofski & Willis, supra note 18 (reviewing the 
literature). 
 65 See generally BIBAS, supra note 19; JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: 
AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS (1977); GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAIN-
ING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003). 
 66 See infra notes 69–104 and accompanying text. 
 67 See infra notes 105–150 and accompanying text. 
 68 See infra notes 151–208 and accompanying text. 
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cused on different sorts of crimes. As both James Forman, Jr. and Michael 
Fortner have shown, even in narrowly drawn communities in which racial mi-
norities make up political majorities, community members can be deeply di-
vided about crime policy.69 
Second, criminal enforcement entails inevitable tradeoffs between com-
munal security and individual freedoms. This tradeoff requires constant recali-
bration: at a given moment in time, security may be of paramount concern, 
while at another moment, state overreach may be perceived as the greater 
threat. A community’s views on the proper balance between the two can be 
affected both by external factors (the crime rate, or public revelation of a par-
ticular state overreach) and internal beliefs (perceptions of safety, or beliefs 
about, and trust in, government).70 
These two features of criminal justice—its differing effects on different 
communities and community members, and the constant recalibration of the 
security/liberty tradeoff—make the idea of a single “public” itself contestable. 
It is better, then, to speak in terms of communities of interest,71 recognizing 
that such communities are dynamic, constantly shifting and realigning, and 
subject to fissures within. 
                                                                                                                           
 69 JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 
119–217 (2017) (documenting the divergence in views of criminal enforcement among the Black 
community in Washington, D.C. in the 1980s and 90s); MICHAEL JAVEN FORTNER, BLACK SILENT 
MAJORITY: THE ROCKEFELLER DRUG LAWS AND THE POLITICS OF PUNISHMENT 173–216 (2015) 
(documenting strong support among working-class African Americans for Governor Nelson Rockefel-
ler’s punitive drug laws in the 1970s, and less support for those laws among African-American politi-
cians). Collectively, these accounts of local constituencies’ role in the drug war undermine the notion 
that localism necessarily breeds lenity. 
 70 See Kenworthey Bilz, Dirty Hands or Deterrence? An Experimental Examination of the Exclu-
sionary Rule, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 149, 156–58 (2012) (finding a link between public per-
ceptions of bad motives on the part of police and willingness to exclude evidence); Jim Norman, 
Americans’ Concerns About National Crime Abating, GALLUP (Nov. 7, 2018), https://news.gallup.
com/poll/244394/americans-concerns-national-crime-abating.aspx [https://perma.cc/H2LT-GALS] 
(documenting the correlation between public perceptions of crime both nationally and locally and the 
tough-on-crime era of the 1980s and 90s). 
 71 My use of this term is somewhat different from its use by the Supreme Court in setting out the 
parameters of constitutionally acceptable community drawing for purposes of electoral districting. See 
Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through Community Representation, 
52 VAND. L. REV. 351, 382–83 (1999) (discussing the Court’s use of the term to denote “a geograph-
ically-identifiable community the majority of which share political interests,” taking into account such 
indicia as geographic contiguity, political affiliation, socio-economic status, occupation, religion, and 
race). My use of the term is far narrower, denoting a community of interest as respect to beliefs on 
matters of criminal justice: about, among other things, the proper role and visibility of policing, penal 
sanctions, and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to prioritize certain crimes over others. 
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1. Interests and Outcomes 
Redefining the “public” in criminal justice as dynamic communities of in-
terest sheds light on a recurring scholarly debate about political support for the 
tough-on-crime measures of the 1980s and 90s. On one side are those for 
whom the rise of order-maintenance policing and mandatory minimum sen-
tences is primarily a product of the amplified political power of white subur-
ban voters over racial and ethnic minorities in cities.72 On the other are those 
who point out the political agency of those urban communities, and how that 
agency could be, and indeed was, utilized to get tough on crime.73 Understand-
ing the criminal justice “public” as dynamic communities of interest helps us 
see how both of these accounts are true. Across very different communities 
with very different concerns and interests, there was an agreement that the bal-
ance between liberty and security had, at that moment in time, to be recalibrat-
ed sharply towards security.74 At the same time, within those communities 
most affected by the recalibration, there were also disagreements about this 
approach (though the dissenters ultimately were in the minority).75 So, too, 
today: any effort to describe a shift in public preferences must be heavily 
bracketed by the inter- and intra-community fissures that inevitably attend it. 
A communities-of-interest understanding also helps us see, in part, why 
certain criminal justice policies succeed politically while others fail. There are a 
number of potential policy approaches to crime: at the back end, incapacitation, 
and at the front end, prevention and deterrence. Back-end tools—policing, pros-
ecution, and imprisonment—may serve a front-end purpose as well, if one be-
lieves their use both prevents and deters would-be offenders (the evidence is 
                                                                                                                           
 72 Stuntz, supra note 22, at 2002–03; see also Vesla M. Weaver, Frontlash: Race and the Devel-
opment of Punitive Crime Policy, 21 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 230, 236–37 (2007) (arguing that the polit-
icization of crime that began in the 1970s was fueled by whites who had lost their battles against civil 
rights in the 1960s). 
 73 See FORMAN, supra note 69, at 124–50 (documenting how politicians seized on African-
American communities’ frustrations with drugs and violence in Washington, D.C. to enact harsher 
sentencing laws in the 1980s); FORTNER, supra note 69, at 173–216 (discussing political support with-
in African-American communities in New York for Governor Rockefeller’s harsh drug laws); Dan M. 
Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1162–63 
(1998) (discussing rising political agency of African-American communities in large cities and impli-
cations for criminal law and procedure). See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE 
LAW (1997). 
 74 In particular, Michael Fortner’s analysis of New York’s various demographic constituencies—
racial, economic, and urban/suburban/rural—and the role each played in supporting New York’s turn 
to harsh drug laws, is illuminating on this point. See FORTNER, supra note 69, at 217–56. 
 75 See FORMAN, supra note 69, at 139–43 (detailing how, in spite of organized opposition, the 
Washington, D.C. city council enacted mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses by significant 
margins in the early 1980s); FORTNER, supra note 69, at 192–99 (portraying a climate of majority 
support within African-American communities for Rockefeller’s drug laws intermixed with currents 
of dissent). 
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mixed).76 Yet there are other long-term methods of crime prevention, such as 
investing more in elementary and secondary public education, job training, and 
child care. But because these front-end methods both intersect with other polit-
ical commitments (to ideals such as limited government and lower taxes, for 
instance) and are so rarely framed as front-end crime-fighting tools to begin 
with, political support becomes complicated and ultimately splintered.77 As 
James Forman, Jr. and Lisa Miller have each cogently argued in different con-
texts, voting majorities can desire a front-end approach to criminal justice, and 
yet, through the compromise of the lawmaking process, come away with only 
back-end policies.78 
Understanding communities of interest in criminal justice helps us see, as 
well, that voting majorities on matters of criminal justice are not fixed interest 
blocs, nor do they necessarily cleave along racial lines. The shift from liberty 
to security that occurred at the end of the last century gained momentum from 
a variety of communities of interest.79 Likewise, swings in the other direction 
are now taking place in jurisdictions that are majority-minority and majority 
white.80 
                                                                                                                           
 76 See Anthony A. Braga et al., Focused Deterrence Strategies and Crime Control: An Updated 
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of the Empirical Evidence, 17 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 
205, 241 (2018) (finding that focused deterrence strategies have moderate crime-reducing effects but 
that more and better evidence is still needed). 
 77 See generally Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, Framing Theory, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 
103 (2007) (providing an overview of empirical research on issue framing and its effects on public 
opinion). 
 78 FORMAN, supra note 69, at 12 (observing that many African Americans in Washington, D.C. 
sought to respond to rising crime rates with both increased criminal enforcement and plans to improve 
jobs, school, and housing—“a Marshall Plan for urban America”—but for a variety of reasons, they 
ended up with only criminal enforcement); LISA L. MILLER, THE MYTH OF MOB RULE: VIOLENT 
CRIME & DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 121–60 (2016) (demonstrating how and why political outcomes in 
the crime space in the last decades of the 20th century did not reflect public preferences, which often 
sought broader social policy answers to the problem of violence). For an account of how back-end 
policies overtook front-end policies at an earlier time, during the Kennedy and Johnson Administra-
tions, see generally ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE 
MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2016). 
 79 See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text. 
 80 For instance, Delaware County, Pennsylvania, which in 2019 ousted an incumbent district 
attorney in favor of the more reform-minded Jack Stollsteimer, is 69% White, 22% African-American, 
and 4% Latino. See QuickFacts: Delaware County, Pennsylvania, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://
www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/delawarecountypennsylvania,US/PST045218 [https://perma.cc/
AY2H-PCNH]. Duval County, Florida, which in 2016 ousted an incumbent district attorney in favor 
of the reformer Melissa Nelson, is 53% White, 31% African-American, and 10% Latino. See Quick-
Facts: Duval County, Florida, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/duvalcounty
florida [https://perma.cc/GU93-5HHU]. Cook County, Illinois, where reformist State’s Attorney Kim 
Foxx ousted the incumbent in 2016, is 42% White, 24% African-American, and 26% Latino. See 
QuickFacts: Cook County, Illinois, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/
table/cookcountyillinois/PST045217 [https://perma.cc/P5UJ-54AY]. The four counties comprising 
Mississippi’s 16th Judicial District, where reformist Scott Colom ousted the incumbent district attorney 
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All of which is to say that the “public” in criminal justice over the last 
half-century has been a messy, dynamic, and constantly shifting concept. The 
implications of this for the enforcement bureaucracy are explored further be-
low. But first, our account of the criminal justice “public” must be placed in 
the context of voting constituencies and voter choice. 
2. Communities and Responsiveness 
In American democracy, voters choose representatives at three levels: 
federal, state, and local. Criminal justice cuts across all three because each lev-
el of government has significant power and authority on matters of criminal 
justice. At the local level, sheriffs, police, and district attorneys have the most 
direct control: their decisions determine who is policed and who is prosecuted, 
and for what crimes. At the state level, legislatures enact criminal laws and pay 
for the prisons that house offenders, while attorneys general prosecute some 
crimes (though far fewer than local prosecutors). At the federal level, Congress 
enacts, and the DOJ enforces, federal criminal laws that reach comparatively 
fewer persons than do state criminal laws; and Congress uses its spending 
power to fund (and through funding, to encourage or constrain) state and local 
enforcers. 
Scholars have long observed asymmetries in authority and responsibility 
for criminal justice across levels of government. And they have blamed these 
asymmetries in part for criminal enforcement excesses.81 Less attention has 
been paid to asymmetries in political responsiveness—that is, the extent to 
which federal, state, and local governments’ criminal justice policies reflect 
their constituents’ preferences. Yet any account of democracy and bureaucracy 
in criminal enforcement must first attend to how the democratic process inter-
nalizes voters’ views on criminal justice. And there is reason to think that, all 
else being equal, this internalization is not symmetric across levels of govern-
ment.82 Specifically, as one moves from the local to the national, political re-
                                                                                                                           
in 2015 are, collectively, nearly evenly divided between Whites and African Americans, as is Philadelph-
ia, Pennsylvania, which elected reformer district attorney Larry Krasner in 2017. See QuickFacts: Clay, 
Oktibbeha, Noxubee, and Lowndes Counties, Mississippi, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.
gov/quickfacts/fact/table/claycountymississippi,oktibbehacountymississippi,noxubeecountymississippi,
lowndescountymississippi/PST045217 [https://perma.cc/83NB-ZEAR]; QuickFacts: Philadelphia and 
Delaware Counties, Pennsylvania, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/
table/philadelphiacountypennsylvania,delawarecountypennsylvania,US/PST045218 [https://perma.cc/
VL8Q-FQ46]. 
 81 See PFAFF, supra note 7, at 142–43 (suggesting that states’ responsibility for the costs of pris-
ons has perverse effects on local prosecutors, because they do not bear the ultimate costs of convic-
tion); Stuntz, supra note 11, at 526 (same). 
 82 The political science literature on electoral accountability, generally, and principal-agent mod-
eling of it, specifically, is vast and rich, and I will not summarize it here. For a helpful overview, see 
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sponsiveness likely diminishes. Differences in the political agency of interest 
groups across local, state, and national legislative venues produce asymmetric 
responsiveness in the criminal justice policy space.83 But additional factors relat-
ed to voter choice compound asymmetric responsiveness in criminal justice. 
One of these differences is the greater number of issues in play in national 
level elections as compared to local and even state elections. Crime can some-
times be a salient issue in state and federal elections (the infamous Willie Hor-
ton ad in the 1988 election between Michael Dukakis and George H.W. Bush is 
a particularly potent example).84 But presidential and congressional elections 
turn on multiple issues in addition to crime and public safety—national securi-
ty, taxes, the economy, healthcare, gun laws, and abortion rights to name just a 
few—and it is difficult to disentangle which among these many issues actually 
influences voters.85 It is therefore equally difficult to attribute, as some have, 
any particular approach to criminal justice favored by the national-level voting 
public—one that is “tough-on-crime” or otherwise.86 
                                                                                                                           
Sean Gailmard, Accountability and Principal-Agent Theory, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY 90, 90–101 (Mark Bovens et al. eds., 2014). My point is that, all else being equal 
with respect to the inherent limitations the electoral system has already been shown to place on ac-
countability, responsiveness to criminal justice policy preferences is not necessarily symmetric across 
the local, state, and federal levels. 
 83 See MILLER, supra note 60, at 120–46 (arguing that a wider range of interest groups and policy 
preferences at the local level makes local criminal justice policy more politically responsive than state 
and national criminal justice policy). 
 84 See Beth Schwartzapfel & Bill Keller, Willie Horton Revisited, MARSHALL PROJECT (May 13, 
2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/05/13/willie-horton-revisited [https://perma.cc/YTN3-
DQFM] (“Ever since 1988, when the George H. W. Bush presidential campaign machine wielded the 
Horton horror story against his Democratic rival, the threat of being ‘Willie Horton’ed’ has shaped the 
politics of crime and punishment.”). 
 85 See generally R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ, INFORMATION AND ELECTIONS (1998) (discussing how 
voters process information on candidate stances on issues); Kent Redding et al., Elections and Voting, 
in HANDBOOK OF POLITICS: STATE AND SOCIETY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 493 (Kevin T. Leicht & J. 
Craig Jenkins eds., 2010) (reviewing conflicting models of voter choice and summarizing debates on 
the salience of race, class, culture, economics, and other issues to voter choice). 
 86 See, e.g., John J. Donohue, Comey, Trump, and the Puzzling Pattern of Crime in 2015 and 
Beyond, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1297, 1297 (2017) (postulating that an eight-point rise in Gallup sur-
veys of Americans’ fear of crime “buoyed Donald Trump to the presidency on his promise to restore 
law and order”); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 416 
(1999) (“Pivotal elections are decided on the basis of candidates’ positions on capital punishment”) 
(referring to the infamous Willie Horton advertisement in the 1988 U.S. presidential election). Strong 
voter correlations across a variety of issues—race, education, socio-economic status, feelings about 
immigration, trade, jobs, crime, and the police, for example—make such reductive claims particularly 
suspect. See Redding et al., supra note 85, at 499–509 (discussing the difficulties of disentangling 
related determinates of voting behavior). Indeed, political scientists are still attempting to unravel what 
motivated Donald Trump’s voters, and have yet to come up with a definitive answer. Compare, e.g., 
Diana C. Mutz, Status Threat, Not Economic Hardship, Explains the 2016 Presidential Vote, 115 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 4330, 4337 (May 8, 2018) (observing in a cross-panel study of Obama/Trump voters 
that relatively higher levels of social dominance orientation—indicating perceived status threat—and 
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There is a second link between voter choice and asymmetries in respon-
siveness on criminal justice policy. Recent work in political science has cast 
doubt on whether voter choice in national and state level elections is a product 
of candidates’ positions on issues or policies at all. To the contrary, this work 
shows that voter choice is primarily a product of both partisan loyalty and neg-
ative partisanship—that is, both identification with one’s party and aversion to 
the opposing party.87 
Both of these circumstances—issue proliferation and partisanship/negative 
partisanship—are significantly mitigated in the local elections that most affect 
the administration of criminal justice: those for mayor, chief prosecutor, and 
(to a lesser degree) sheriff.88 First, local elections invariably involve fewer is-
                                                                                                                           
feelings about trade and China’s rising economic dominance each predicted support for Trump, while 
feelings about immigration and the economy did not predict support), with John Sides, Race, Religion 
and Immigration in 2016: How the Debate Over American Identity Shaped the Election and What It 
Means for a Trump Presidency, DEMOCRACY FUND VOTER STUDY GRP. REPORT 1, 9–13 (June 2017), 
https://www.voterstudygroup.org/publications/2016-elections/race-religion-immigration-2016 [https://
perma.cc/SX9D-L4JD] (concluding that, in a cross-panel study of white Obama/Trump voters and 
white Romney/Clinton voters, the salience of race, religion, and immigration in the 2016 U.S. presi-
dential election largely accounted for voters’ choice). 
 87 See generally CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & LARRY M. BARTELS, DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS: 
WHY ELECTIONS DO NOT PRODUCE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT (2016) (surveying decades of social 
science research on voting, concluding that national-level election outcomes reflect voters’ partisan 
loyalties rather than feelings on issues, that partisan loyalty is in turn determined primarily by social 
identity, and that voters alter issue stances to accord with those of candidates in their chosen party); 
Alan I. Abramowitz & Steven Webster, The Rise of Negative Partisanship and the Nationalization of 
U.S. Elections in the 21st Century, 41 ELECTORAL STUD. 12 (2016) (discussing the rise of straight 
party-line voting in national elections, and demonstrating a causal link to voter feelings of partisanship 
and negative partisanship); Shanto Iyengar & Masha Krupenkin, The Strengthening of Partisan Affect, 
39 ADVANCES POL. PSYCHOL. 201 (2018) (same, from a psychological frame); Joel Sievert & Seth C. 
McKee, Nationalization in U.S. Senate and Gubernatorial Elections, 47 AM. POL. RES. 1055 (2019) 
(finding, based on analysis of election results and exit polling data in presidential election years, a 
significant increase in same-party votes with respect to U.S. Senate elections and, to a slightly lesser 
degree, gubernatorial elections—with over ninety percent of voters polled reporting having voted for 
the same party in presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial races in 2008 and 2012); see also general-
ly Jonathan Kropko & Kevin K. Banda, Issue Scales, Information Cues, and the Proximity and Direc-
tional Models of Voter Choice, 71 POL. RES. Q. 772 (2018) (discussing a rise in directional voting, in 
which voters choose candidates based on positions to the right or left of center even if a position is 
more distant from the voter’s actual preference on the issue, and drawing a link to the rise of political 
polarization and extreme candidates). 
 88 I exclude from my analysis local legislative (city or county council) elections because of local 
legislative bodies’ negligible impact on local criminal justice policy. Because nearly all crimes are 
legislated at the state rather than local level, enforcement practices (controlled by police commission-
ers and prosecutors) have a far greater effect on the local administration of criminal justice. See infra 
Part II.C.1. Sheriffs have a relatively lesser impact on criminal justice than prosecutors and mayors, 
because their policing authority extends only to areas of a county without a municipal police force, or 
where they contract with a municipality to offer policing services. See, e.g., James Tomberlin, Note, 
“Don’t Elect Me”: Sheriffs and the Need for Reform in County Law Enforcement, 104 VA. L. REV. 
113, 122–23 (2018) (“Many sheriffs are now without law enforcement power, either because a county 
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sues than national and state level elections; a small set of issues, or even a sin-
gle issue, can more easily dominate a given campaign. A prime example is the 
2013 mayoral campaign in New York City, which revolved around concerns 
about policing (specifically the New York City Police Department’s stop & 
frisk policy) and income inequality.89 What’s more, the small group of issues at 
play in local elections invariably includes crime and safety.90 
Second, and more importantly, in light of the research on partisanship and 
voter choice, local elections tend to be far less about partisan identity than state 
and national elections. Research on partisanship in big-city mayoral elections 
has shown it to be of little moment, even as political polarization has risen na-
tionally.91 And the scant available research on prosecutor elections92 tends to 
                                                                                                                           
police force has taken over that task or because there are no unincorporated areas in a county for the 
sheriff to police.”). 
 89 See Michael Barbaro & David W. Chen, De Blasio Is Elected New York City Mayor in Land-
slide, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/nyregion/de-blasio-is-elected-
new-york-city-mayor.html [https://perma.cc/LN5G-PP9X]; Jim Dwyer, Vowing to Slay the (Already 
Subdued) Stop-and-Frisk Dragon, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/06/
nyregion/de-blasio-and-bratton-promise-to-deliver-on-goals-but-give-no-credit.html [https://perma.cc/
PW63-5TG8]. A more recent example is the 2018 San Francisco mayoral election, a hotly contested 
race that centered mainly on the city’s housing affordability crisis. See Nitasha Tiku, How Tech 
Shaped San Francisco’s Unresolved Mayor’s Race, WIRED (June 11, 2018), https://www.wired.com/
story/how-tech-shaped-san-franciscos-unresolved-mayors-race/ [https://perma.cc/5SEE-FL48] (“The 
mayor’s race centered around a vigorous battle over housing in the city, where buying a home is in-
conceivable for many and longtime residents are being squeezed out.”). 
 90 See R. Douglas Arnold & Nicholas Carnes, Holding Mayors Accountable: New York’s Execu-
tives from Koch to Bloomberg, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 949, 960 (2012) (finding a linkage between the 
New York Mayor’s approval rating and the crime rate). Prosecutor campaigns are by nature single-
issue. 
 91 See KAREN M. KAUFMANN, THE URBAN VOTER: GROUP CONFLICT & MAYORAL VOTING 
BEHAVIOR IN AMERICAN CITIES 3 (2004) (finding, in a deep study of mayoral elections in New York 
and Los Angeles, and in a cursory review of other major cities’ mayoral election results, that “party 
identification, so important to presidential and congressional voting, is not always salient in local 
elections”); David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council Elections?: The 
Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419, 420 (2007) (“Philadelphia and Los Angeles . . . ha[ve] had 
some competitive mayoral elections, although without the type of sustained partisan or other group 
competition that marks other executive races like Presidential and gubernatorial campaigns . . . .”); 
Schleicher, supra, at 439 (“That voters behave differently in local elections than they do in national 
elections is . . . assumed by most political scientists of all stripes.”). 
 92 There are three empirical studies of prosecutor elections. Two, by Professor Ronald Wright, 
collectively surveyed all prosecutorial elections between 1996 and 2006 in fifteen states, studying 
both the outcomes of the races (whether an incumbent ran opposed or unopposed, and the result), 
along with the major campaign issues as portrayed in news accounts during the races. See Wright, 
supra note 39, at 592 (initial study, evaluating prosecutor election results from ten states); Ronald F. 
Wright, Beyond Prosecutor Elections, 67 SMU L. REV. 593, 600 (2014) [hereinafter Wright, Beyond 
Prosecutor Elections] (subsequent study, evaluating prosecutorial election results from an additional 
five states). The third study, by Professor Carissa Hessick and Michael Morse, has collected data on 
prosecutor elections from 2,318 jurisdictions across forty-five states in 2014 and 2016 and analyzed 
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show that partisanship plays little, if any, role in outcomes.93 To the extent par-
tisanship (and negative partisanship) does play a role, it of course does so only 
at the general election stage. Yet as voters continue to self-segregate politically 
along local jurisdictional boundaries—generally, left-leaning voters cluster in 
urban counties and right-leaning voters in rural counties94—local elections in 
lopsidedly partisan counties can end up becoming most competitive in the pri-
mary stage, where, with party identification removed from the voter choice 
calculus, issues and policies can and do take center stage.95 
This is not to say that mayoral, prosecutor, and sheriff elections produce 
politically responsive mayors, prosecutors, and sheriffs. Dynamics other than 
partisanship—among them strong incumbency advantage, limited information, 
and low salience (and turnout) among voters—can hamper political respon-
siveness in local prosecutor and sheriff elections.96 But unlike the partisan-
                                                                                                                           
the number of contested elections and incumbent victories. See Hessick & Morse, supra note 38 
(manuscript at 20–23). 
 93 See Wright, supra note 39, at 606 (finding, in a study of over two thousand elections in ten 
states, that “the candidates do not place much weight on [party labels],” and that “[h]eavier use of 
party labels might not accomplish much in prosecutor elections—Democrats and Republicans are 
equally capable of talking about the best combination of toughness and fairness”); see also Wright, 
Beyond Prosecutor Elections, supra note 92, at 603 (finding, in a study incorporating election data 
from 1996 to 2006 from fifteen states, some with non-partisan prosecutor elections, no significant 
differences in the effects of partisanship on incumbency advantage, but finding that fewer incumbents 
ran unopposed in nonpartisan elections). I am aware of no research on voter choice in sheriff elec-
tions; this is an area in need of study. 
 94 KIM PARKER ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., WHAT UNITES AND DIVIDES URBAN, SUBURBAN 
AND RURAL COMMUNITIES 29–37 (May 22, 2018), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/
sites/3/2018/05/02094832/Pew-Research-Center-Community-Type-Full-Report-FINAL.pdf. For a 
visual demonstration, one need only view a county-by-county map of voting in the 2016 U.S. presi-
dential election. See, e.g., Election Results 2016 by State and County, POLITICO (Nov. 8, 2016), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/election-results-2016-by-state-and-county-229735 [https://
perma.cc/JR4P-LHA3] (showing election results by county). 
 95 Of course, this occurs in state and national level primaries in lopsidedly partisan jurisdictions, 
too; it is why, for instance, presidential candidates campaign in the lopsidedly partisan state of South 
Carolina at the primary stage (it holds its primary elections early in the cycle) and all but ignore this 
state at the general election stage. See Lindsey Cook et al., U.S. News & World Report Presidential 
Campaign Tracker, GITHUB, https://github.com/lindzcook/USNCampaignTracker [https://perma.cc/
2EP9-BDBA] (compiling visits by primary candidates to early primary states); Two-thirds of Presi-
dential Campaign Is in Just 6 States, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/
campaign-events-2016 [https://perma.cc/J9MW-MQSS] (compiling state-by-state data on the number 
of post-convention campaign visits by 2016 U.S. presidential candidates). But at the level of govern-
ance, the sum total result of national and state level general elections tends (with some exceptions) to 
reflect the partisan divides of the state or nation as a whole. See David Schleicher, Federalism and 
State Democracy, 95 TEX. L. REV. 763 (2017) (observing that state elections tend to follow national-
level partisan divides, with a few exceptions in some gubernatorial races). Not so at the local level of 
governance, where elected officials reflect the policy preferences—as opposed to partisan prefer-
ences—of the dominant party’s primary voters. 
 96 See Wright, supra note 39, at 582 (discussing the prevalence of the incumbency advantage and 
lack of information in an empirical study of local prosecutor elections in ten states); Tomberlin, supra 
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ship/negative partisanship dynamic, which has played a more pronounced role 
in national and state level elections in recent years, these other responsiveness-
reducing dynamics are waning. In recent years, for instance, prosecutor elec-
tions are becoming more salient, and incumbency has been, in a notable series 
of elections, more of a liability than an advantage.97 The same might be said of 
some recent sheriff elections.98 
                                                                                                                           
note 88, at 143–44 (discussing the prevalence of these dynamics in sheriff elections). Mayoral elec-
tions are generally high-salience elections. See Schleicher, supra note 91, at 468 (claiming that 
mayoral elections produce a lot of media attention and campaign spending that can provide voters 
with more information than other types of local elections). 
 Money can also play a distorting role, as others have observed. See generally JANE MAYER, 
DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES BEHIND THE RISE OF THE RADICAL 
RIGHT (2016). Yet while researchers have begun to document the influence of money on national and 
state level elections, we know little, beyond anecdotal accounts, about the financing of campaigns for 
elected enforcement leaders and its effect on electoral outcomes. See Michael Smolens, Soros’ Bid to 
Overhaul Criminal Justice System Hits a Wall in Calif., SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (June 6, 2018), 
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/columnists/michael-smolens/sd-me-elex-smolens-
20180605-story.html [https://perma.cc/YP8X-77SM] (describing a series of prosecutor elections in 
which heavy spending by outside groups on both sides did not seem to change the races’ fundamen-
tals); Paige St. John & Abbie Vansickle, Prosecutor Elections Now a Front Line in the Justice Wars, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (May 23, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/05/23/prosecutor-
elections-now-a-front-line-in-the-justice-wars [https://perma.cc/WEG9-7X2F] (reporting on the mil-
lions of dollars donated by wealthy philanthropists to support reformist prosecutor candidates in a 
number of high profile races around the country, and on financing from police and prosecutor unions 
and other groups to support incumbents). Fortunately, a much-needed systematic study in this area is 
currently underway. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Prosecutors and Politics Project: Study of Cam-
paign Contributions in Prosecutorial Elections (July 18, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3202875) (describing ongoing data collection on 
campaign contributions in prosecutorial elections). 
 97 See Neff, supra note 4 (examining a number of recent prosecutorial elections in which progres-
sive candidates defeated incumbents); Sklansky, supra note 3, at 667 (same). 
 98 See, e.g., Aris Folley, North Carolina Voters Oust Sheriff Who Backed Trump’s Immigration 
Policies, THE HILL (May 14, 2018), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/387555-north-carolina-
voters-oust-sheriff-for-backing-trumps-immigration-policies [https://perma.cc/B92S-8Y2B] (reporting 
on the May 2018 primary election for sheriff of Mecklenberg County, North Carolina, in which Dem-
ocratic primary voters effectively elected a new sheriff due to the absence of any Republican chal-
lenger, ousting the incumbent who had helped federal immigration authorities identify deportable 
aliens); Michael Kiefer & Rebekah L. Sanders, Penzone Unseats ‘Toughest Sheriff’ Arpaio, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/11/08/
maricopa-county-sheriff-joe-arpaio-paul-penzone-election-results/93169028/ [https://perma.cc/5M72-
V5C9] (reporting on the November 2016 election for sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona, in which 
voters ousted an incumbent who gained national notoriety for his aggressive enforcement of federal im-
migration laws and illegal racial profiling); Margaret Matray, Michael Moore Ousts Longtime Ports-
mouth Sheriff Bill Watson, VIRGINIAN PILOT (Nov. 7, 2017), https://pilotonline.com/news/government/
politics/local/article_0430346d-ba52-57d0-8a94-e2711a3a6d9f.html [https://perma.cc/7XCG-S4X9] 
(reporting on the November 2017 election for sheriff of Portsmouth County, Virginia, in which voters 
ousted a twelve-year incumbent in favor of a former federal law enforcement agent who favored reha-
bilitative approaches to incarceration). 
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All of these distinctions between local elections and national and state 
level elections have important implications for political responsiveness. The 
first is that election results for political offices most impacting criminal en-
forcement on the ground—mayors, local prosecutors, and (to a lesser degree) 
sheriffs—likely better reflect voters’ criminal justice preferences than national 
and state level election results. (State-level ballot propositions on criminal jus-
tice issues might seem an exception, but research on direct democracy has 
shown it to be less reflective of the public’s preferences than representative 
democracy.)99 The second, a corollary of the first, is that local elections place 
relatively more pressure on the winners to respond to those preferences once in 
office. If elections are determined more by negative partisanship than beliefs 
about issues and policies, then voters have less interest in an elected official’s 
policy stances, and the official in turn has little incentive to defer to voter pref-
erence in enacting policies.100 
This sliding scale of political responsiveness is particularly meaningful in 
the criminal justice arena, in which federal, state, and local governments have 
overlapping yet largely independent policy-making authority.101 It helps ex-
plain the gap between public opinion polls that show strong public support 
from a broad cross-section of Americans for criminal justice reforms such as 
                                                                                                                           
 99 Among ballot propositions’ weaknesses as an instrument of representative policy making are 
an absence of alternative policy choices beyond the binary yes or no; the ease with which different 
results are reached depending on how ballot propositions are ordered and presented; when multiple 
alternatives are presented, the absence of ranked-choice voting; and the ease with which special inter-
est groups can put a proposal on the ballot, short-circuiting the give-and-take required for legislation. 
For a detailed discussion of these problems, see generally JOHN HASKELL, DIRECT DEMOCRACY OR 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT? DISPELLING THE POPULIST MYTH (2001); PETER SCHRAG, PARA-
DISE LOST: CALIFORNIA’S EXPERIENCE, AMERICA’S FUTURE (1998). 
 100 See Iyengar & Krupenkin, supra note 87, at 212 (“The logic of positive motivations holds 
candidates accountable—if they fail to deliver, citizens will no longer support them. However, when 
citizens’ support for a candidate stems primarily from their strong dislike for the opposing candidate, 
they are less subject to the logic of accountability. Their psychic satisfaction comes more from defeat-
ing and humiliating the outgroup, and less from any performance or policy beneﬁts that might accrue 
from the victory of the in-party.”). 
 101 See, e.g., Daniel C. Richman, The Changing Boundaries Between Federal and Local Law 
Enforcement, in 2 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2000, BOUNDARY CHANGES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE ORGANIZA-
TIONS 81, 91–96 (Charles M. Friel ed., 2000) (noting that despite the overlap in substantive law and 
authority between the federal and state systems, the two sides have coordinated over time to carve out 
relatively discrete areas of authority). Few other policy-making arenas share this feature. Although 
many permit concurrent regulation by states and the federal government, such dual-sovereign regula-
tion “comes at the grace of Congress,” in the form of permission granted by federal statutes. Abbe R. 
Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law 
in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 585 (2011); see also id. at 539–40 (discussing a 
variety of federal regulatory statutes with this feature). In contrast, criminal lawmaking and enforce-
ment authority as between the federal government and state and local governments is both overlapping 
and independent; cooperation between federal and local enforcers is a function of choice rather than 
law, a feature I explore in further detail in Part II.C. 
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reducing mandatory minimum penalties and decriminalizing certain offenses, 
and divergent policies on the federal level.102 It also helps explain, at least in 
small part, the disconnect between the law-and-order platform of the Trump 
Administration and the more progressive criminal justice platforms of some lo-
cal elected leaders in counties won by President Trump in the 2016 election.103 
3. Implications 
In discussing the political responsiveness of a bureaucracy, the antecedent 
question remains: responsive to whom?104 The notable features of the criminal 
justice “public”—shifting interests and alignments, and asymmetric political 
responsiveness across levels of government—have important implications for 
the criminal enforcement bureaucracy. If the public’s preferences on criminal 
justice are constantly shifting and realigning, and if its electoral choices can be 
written off as manifestations of partisanship and negative partisanship rather 
than clear preferences on issues, then actual public preferences on criminal 
justice policy are more easily ignored by elected officials and, in turn, the 
criminal enforcement bureaucracy that reports to them. If, on the other hand, 
the democratic process reflects public preferences on criminal justice and elec-
                                                                                                                           
 102 See CHARLES KOCH INST., New Poll Suggests Surprising Support for Criminal Justice Re-
forms Among Trump Voters (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.charleskochinstitute.org/news/new-poll-
suggests-surprising-support-criminal-justice-reforms-among-trump-voters/ [https://perma.cc/LG36-
YCJ6]; Lydia Wheeler, Poll: 3/4 of Americans Support Criminal Justice Reform, THE HILL (Jan. 25 
2018), http://thehill.com/regulation/370692-poll-3-4-of-americans-support-criminal-justice-reform 
[https://perma.cc/3X8E-LL66]. 
 103 For instance, Duval County, Florida voted for Trump in the 2016 U.S. presidential election by 
a margin of 1.5% (10,570 votes), although the same county just months earlier ousted longtime in-
cumbent prosecutor Angela Corey in favor of more reform-minded candidate Melissa Nelson, by a 
margin of thirty-eight points (both candidates were Republican; no Democrat ran). See Jessica Pishko, 
Voters Have Ousted Notorious Florida Prosecutor Angela Corey, THE NATION (Aug. 31, 2016), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/voters-have-ousted-notorious-florida-prosecutor-angela-corey/ 
[https://perma.cc/NF5G-R4P8]; 2016 Florida Presidential Election Results by County, POLITICO 
(Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.politico.com/2016-election/results/map/president/florida/ [https://perma.
cc/JA26-Q5YJ]. Similarly, voters in conservative Lowndes County, Mississippi voted for Donald 
Trump in the 2016 U.S. presidential election by a margin of 6.3% (1,579 votes), while in the prior 
year’s contested district attorney race between Independent incumbent Forrest Allgood and Democrat-
ic reformist Scott Colom, Colom lost by only a 2.6% margin (690 votes) in the county—even though 
county-wide voter turnout in the 2015 district attorney race exceeded the 2016 U.S. presidential elec-
tion by over 2,200 votes. See MISS. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2015 General Election Results, http://www.sos.
ms.gov/Elections-Voting/Pages/2015-General-Election.aspx [https://perma.cc/E5R4-K29M] (reflect-
ing Colom’s ultimate victory in the race, which covered a four-county jurisdiction); 2016 Mississippi 
Presidential Election Results by County, POLITICO (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.politico.com/2016-
election/results/map/president/mississippi/ [https://perma.cc/4RAA-V53K]. 
 104 See JUDITH E. GRUBER, CONTROLLING BUREAUCRACIES: DILEMMAS IN DEMOCRATIC GOV-
ERNANCE 48–60 (1987) (observing that discussions about mechanisms for controlling bureaucracies 
proceed from underlying normative beliefs about whose interests one is controlling for, as well as 
presumptions about political actors’ capacity to advance those interests). 
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tion outcomes, elected officials—and the career civil servants they lead—will 
feel greater pressure to take those preferences into account in calibrating en-
forcement discretion. 
From this starting point we can begin to sketch a working hypothesis about 
bureaucratic responsiveness in criminal justice: local criminal enforcement bu-
reaucracies are positioned to be more responsive to public preferences—and 
changes in public preferences—than state and national level enforcement bu-
reaucracies. But this hypothesis only considers the interplay between the voting 
public and elected leaders on matters of criminal justice. There is also interplay 
between elected leaders and the career enforcers they lead. Its varying aspects, 
and effects on political responsiveness, are considered next. 
B. The Bureaucracy 
How do apolitical actors in the criminal enforcement space respond to 
their elected or politically appointed leaders? Specifically, if we place criminal 
enforcement institutions in a principal-agent frame, who is the principal and 
who is the agent?105 How do the interests and goals of elected and appointed 
enforcement leaders on the one hand, and career enforcers on the other, create 
differing incentives for each group?106 Further, what are the motivations of 
each group, and how do these motivations affect attitudes towards system re-
form?107 These questions are the subject of this Section. 
1. Principles and Agents 
Although the fields of public administration, political theory, and admin-
istrative law have long considered the tensions between elected and politically 
appointed leaders and career civil servants, little of that scholarship looks be-
low the federal level.108 The principal-agent concept as applied in the context 
of federal executive branch agencies most often conceptualizes the agency and 
                                                                                                                           
 105 See infra notes 108–117 and accompanying text. 
 106 See infra notes 118–129 and accompanying text. 
 107 See infra notes 130–150 and accompanying text. 
 108 See GRUBER, supra note 104, at 48–60 (summarizing the literature); see also Gailmard, supra 
note 82, at 95 (“One of the earliest, and still most robust, principal-agent literatures in political science 
takes bureaucrats as agents of some constellation of political principals—most often Congress, the 
president or executive actors, and/or courts.”). For a notable exception, see generally MICHAEL 
LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980), 
examining local level bureaucracies and their leaders. 
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its employees as the “agent,” and Congress, which oversees the agencies and 
determines their spending allocations, as the “principal.”109 
This frame is quite useful in exploring criminal enforcement dynamics at 
the federal level.110 But it does not map as easily onto local criminal justice. In 
the local context, enforcement agents—police departments and prosecutors—
have a range of principals. These include the voters themselves, who, every 
few years, elect the chief prosecutor of their local jurisdiction and the sheriff of 
their county; mayors, who hire and can fire the police commissioner; local and 
state legislative bodies that have responsibility in varying degrees for allocat-
ing prosecutors’ and police departments’ budgets;111 and federal programs of-
ficers, who keep tabs on local police departments’ and prosecutors’ offices’ use 
of federal grant program funds and compliance with funding requirements.112 
This diffusion of principals makes local criminal enforcement institutions 
less politically responsive than a pure voter choice analysis would indicate.113 
An elected district attorney, for instance, may receive one message about en-
forcement priorities from her constituents, another from the city council, and 
yet another from the state legislature or governor. A police commissioner must 
balance potentially conflicting requests from the mayor who exercises ap-
pointment and removal authority over commissioners, the city council and 
state legislature that fund the police department, and the federal program office 
that supplements those funds. 
The same dynamic can occur at the federal level. For instance, an attorney 
general may receive conflicting messages from the President and Congress 
about enforcement priorities. But there, principal-diffusion has less of an effect 
                                                                                                                           
 109 See Gailmard, supra note 82, at 96 (describing the idea that “[o]ne should understand Con-
gress as a principal and various bureaucrats as its agents” as “the central premise of thought on bu-
reaucratic institutions based on principal-agent theory”). 
 110 See Ouziel, supra note 28, at 1122 (exploring how congressional oversight and appropriations 
create sometimes perverse agency incentives in the context of federal drug enforcement). 
 111 Although, across all states, local legislative bodies fund the lion’s share of municipal police 
department budgets—in fiscal year 2015, local governments comprised 86.7% of the total amount 
spent on police by state and local governments—state governments also contribute a portion of their 
funding, and in some jurisdictions local law enforcement budgets are dictated largely by the state 
legislature. See, e.g., Jack Brammer, Budget Cuts Will Cripple Justice System, Allow ‘Horrific’ Crimes, 
Lawyers Tell Bevin, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.kentucky.com/news/
politics-government/article175654781.html [https://perma.cc/H3JP-JM8C] (discussing significant 
effects of announced state budget cuts on Kentucky’s fifty-seven commonwealth’s attorneys’ offices, 
which prosecute felony crimes). 
 112 See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL GRANTS TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERN-
MENTS 12–23 (Mar. 2013), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/reports/03-
05-13federalgrantsonecol.pdf (describing federal oversight of grants awarded to state governments); 
Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 890–91 
(2015) (discussing federal funding arrangements for local police departments). 
 113 See supra Part II.A.2. 
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on responsiveness. First, as we have seen, federal criminal enforcement is al-
ready relatively less politically responsive, making principal-diffusion relative-
ly less impactful.114 Second, the diffusion exists at the same level of govern-
ment—the same sovereign—allowing conflicts between principals to be 
worked out directly.115 Not so at the local level; a police commissioner or dis-
trict attorney will be forced to balance conflicting demands from different sover-
eigns alone. And given the differences between sovereigns in terms of both vot-
ing constituency and the factors that affect voter choice,116 such conflicts are 
likely to arise more often. The battle between former Attorney General Jeff Ses-
sions and mayors who declared their cities sanctuaries for undocumented im-
migrants is a particularly visible manifestation of this dynamic, but by no 
means is it unique.117 
Then there is the second-order principal-agent relationship: that between 
the elected or politically appointed leaders of a criminal enforcement institu-
tion and those in their employ. The second-order principal-agent issues that 
arise are even more confounding. Whereas the first-order tensions are a result 
primarily of principal-diffusion among sovereigns and the conflicting political 
demands it places upon enforcement leaders, second-order tensions reflect 
foundational differences between how career enforcers and enforcement lead-
ers see themselves. The following Subsections explore that divide. 
2. Goals and Incentives 
Broadly speaking, the goals of elected and appointed leaders in criminal 
enforcement and the goals of career criminal enforcers are generally aligned: 
all are to some degree motivated by a desire to serve the public and further the 
mission of enhancing public safety. But one need not dig far beneath that su-
perficial alignment to see the makings of discord. 
                                                                                                                           
 114 See supra Part II.A.2. 
 115 Indeed, this is what happens in the normal course through the federal budgeting process. See 
Ouziel, supra note 28, at 1129–39 (discussing how the DOJ’s appropriations request first goes 
through the White House, then Congress, and then is further refined through the hearing process). 
 116 See supra Part II.A.2. 
 117 See Nicole Rodriguez, Trump Administration Wants to Arrest Mayors of ‘Sanctuary Cities,’ 
NEWSWEEK (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/trump-administration-wants-arrest-mayors-
sanctuary-cities-783010 [https://perma.cc/9X9R-RQUD] (documenting the DOJ’s warning to local 
officials that they could face criminal liability for ordering non-cooperation with federal immigration 
officers). The divergence between states and the federal government on the issue of marijuana legali-
zation is another example. See Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, to All U.S. Att’ys (Jan. 4, 2018) [hereinafter Sessions Memorandum, Jan. 2018], https://
www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1022196/download (calling for federal prosecutors to prose-
cute marijuana-related crimes as they would any other federal crime). 
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The goals of elected and politically appointed criminal enforcement lead-
ers will vary depending on the environmental context in which they operate. 
As public choice theory teaches, elected leaders—particularly those who are 
not term-limited, such as prosecutors or sheriffs—are primarily motivated by 
the desire to be reelected or campaign for a higher political office.118 Appoint-
ed leaders in the federal criminal justice system—namely, the Attorney Gen-
eral and the ninety-four U.S. Attorneys who report to him or her—may be mo-
tivated by lucrative job prospects in the private sector (the so-called revolving 
door), other government service as lawyers, or political or judicial office.119 
Appointed local police commissioners tend to move from the leadership of one 
police department to another, a sort of interior revolving door.120 Despite the 
variance between these end goals, they all tend to produce similar motivations 
for leaders in office: making a name for oneself through high-profile enforce-
ment successes and delivering on a promised agenda.121 
Career-level enforcers’ goals can be somewhat different. As with leaders, 
career-level enforcers’ goals vary depending on the environment. There is a 
greater revolving-door dynamic among prosecutors than among federal law 
enforcement agents and local police, more of whom remain in their positions 
until retirement.122 And among prosecutors, the revolving-door dynamic var-
                                                                                                                           
 118 See Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice and Legal Scholarship, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 490, 491 
(1996) (citing ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 28–30 (1957); MORRIS P. 
FIORINA, REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL CALLS, AND CONSTITUENCIES 29–38 (1974)) (“[P]eople who 
hold elective office will always try to maximize their chance of reelection.”). 
 119 See Todd Lochner, Strategic Behavior and Prosecutorial Agenda Setting in United States 
Attorneys’ Offices: The Role of U.S. Attorneys and Their Assistants, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 271, 278 (2002) 
(finding, in a study of subsequent employment of 274 U.S. Attorneys, that 60% went to private prac-
tice, 21% to judgeships, 9% to other government legal positions, 7% to elected office, and 2% to aca-
demia); see also Jennifer Nou, Essay, Subdelegating Powers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 478–79 & 
n.35 (2017) (observing the differences between elected leaders of Congress, who are motivated by 
job-retention, and federal agency heads, who are “tempted by the revolving door”). 
 120 One commentator describes these commissioners as “an informal cadre of policing intellectu-
als, who move[] from city to city, sometimes running departments and sometimes working as consult-
ants . . . .” Simone Weichselbaum, The Rise and Fall of Anthony Batts, MARSHALL PROJECT (July 10, 
2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/07/10/the-rise-and-fall-of-anthony-batts [https://
perma.cc/VZD8-YLUP]. 
 121 See Lochner, supra note 119, at 277–81 (observing that most U.S. Attorneys enter jobs with 
personal agendas, often shaped by both the DOJ’s priorities and a desire to maximize future employ-
ment opportunities); David Zaring, Against Being Against the Revolving Door, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 
507, 517–18 (discussing such incentives for appointed and elected chief prosecutors). 
 122 Based on 2008 data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, only 7.4% of state and local law 
enforcement officers left their employ, and of this percentage, half were on account of resignation, and 
about a quarter on account of retirement. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, HIRING AND RETENTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 
2008—STATISTICAL TABLES 6 (Oct. 2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/hrslleo08st.pdf. In 
contrast, data obtained by the Bureau of Justice Statistics in 2005 revealed that over 60% of large and 
medium size prosecutors’ offices, and 30% of small offices, reported problems in retaining prosecu-
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ies: Assistant U.S. Attorneys (AUSAs) are more likely to move to the private 
sector than Assistant District Attorneys (ADAs); though even among AUSAs, 
these tendencies vary by geographic regions,123 and the attrition rate has fallen 
over time.124 
The goals and incentives of “careerist” enforcers (career enforcers who do 
not subsequently work in the private sector) diverge from their elected or polit-
ically appointed leaders. There is less pressure on careerists to conform to a 
politically driven agenda or to demonstrate quantifiable successes. To the con-
trary, careerists may be incentivized to seek out a more risk-averse, and per-
haps less labor-intensive path (albeit one that maximizes compensation).125 
Careerists looking to do the bare minimum may be disinclined to execute on a 
new leader’s priorities, as any change in the status quo requires some amount 
of reorganizational effort.126 And non-shirking careerists may find a new leader 
lacking in the requisite expertise or simply think of the leader (and the leader’s 
priorities) as transient.127 
                                                                                                                           
tors. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 
2005, at 3 (July 2006), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc05.pdf. Same-year data on retention 
rates among police and prosecutors is unavailable. 
 123 Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long, Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives of Fed-
eral Prosecutors, 48 J.L. & ECON. 627, 627 (2005) (finding, in an empirical study revealing geograph-
ic variation in attrition rates of AUSAs, that higher rates exist in cities with more lucrative private-
sector employment); Charles D. Weisselberg & Su Li, Big Law’s Sixth Amendment: The Rise of Cor-
porate White-Collar Practices in Large U.S. Law Firms, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1221, 1254–56, 1259–60 
(2011) (finding, in a 2010 study of 2,809 lawyers in white collar defense practices at the top 200 
grossing firms in the United States, a substantial number of former AUSAs (comprising 67% of 700 
firm partners with primarily white collar practices) and far lower numbers of former ADAs (compris-
ing 10% of 700 firm partners with primarily white collar practices), with the greatest concentration of 
white collar practices—and former AUSAs—in New York, Washington, D.C., Chicago, San Francis-
co, and Los Angeles). 
 124 See Lochner, supra note 119, at 282–83 (documenting and discussing a rise in “careerist” 
AUSAs, who stay in their posts rather than seek private-sector employment). 
 125 See generally EDITH LINN, ARREST DECISIONS: WHAT WORKS FOR THE OFFICER? (2009) 
(discussing street officers’ practice of making arrests towards the end of a shift in order to generate 
overtime from the subsequent booking and court presentment procedures); Lochner, supra note 119, 
at 282–83 (discussing the shirking incentives for careerist AUSAs and perceptions by non-careerists 
of “deadwood” careerist prosecutors). 
 126 See Wesley G. Skogan, Why Reforms Fail, 18 POLICING & SOC’Y 23, 26 (2008) (“There is 
also resistance to change when—and because—it requires that officers do many of their old jobs in 
new ways, and that they take on tasks that they never imagined would come their way.”). 
 127 See Lochner, supra note 119, at 287 (finding, in a series of interviews with AUSAs and U.S. 
Attorneys, aversion among careerist AUSAs to following an agenda of any particular U.S. Attorney, 
who are often viewed as having relatively less prosecutorial expertise, or simply as transient leaders 
who will in time be replaced); Skogan, supra note 126, at 26 (“Enthusiasm by public officials and 
community activists for innovations in policing encourages its detractors within the force to dismiss 
reforms as ‘just politics.’ They see them as passing fads, something dreamed up by civilians for the 
police to do.”). 
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Career enforcers eyeing the exits—as noted, almost always prosecutors as 
opposed to law enforcement agents—have a strong disincentive to shirk. Yet 
when it comes to delivering on a leader’s request, ambitious career prosecutors 
may be no more so inclined than their careerist colleagues. The external mar-
ket for line prosecutors values trial experience, coupled with evidence of dili-
gence and aggressiveness.128 Advancing the particular prosecutorial priorities 
of one’s leader is of little value—and in fact may be detrimental to one’s value 
if such priorities do not generate the type of experience most useful in the pri-
vate sector.129 
3. Motivation and Reform 
For a variety of reasons, then, career enforcers—both those who stay and 
those who are soon to leave—have relatively little incentive to advance a lead-
er’s political agenda. And when that agenda is reform-oriented, career enforc-
ers have some motivation to resist it. This motivation arises from career en-
forcers’ sense of mission; the way they view the objects of reform; and the de-
gree of deference they accord the status quo. 
Like other bureaucrats, career enforcers see their mission as one separate 
and apart from politics—a mission that endures through shifting political 
winds.130 In the field of criminal enforcement, where rule-of-law fidelity runs 
deep, this aversion to politics is something career enforcers wear as a badge of 
honor.131 Career criminal enforcers view themselves as loyal not to their elect-
                                                                                                                           
 128 See Boylan & Long, supra note 123, at 627, 635–42 (arguing that statistically significant dif-
ference in trial rates of drug-trafficking cases in federal districts with higher private-sector salaries is 
evidence of AUSAs’ efforts in such districts to market themselves for employment in the private sec-
tor); Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Econ-
omy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 607–08 (2005) (postulating that the private-
sector market value of trial experience may cause AUSAs to charge harder-to-prove cases, as they are 
more likely to end in a trial rather than a guilty plea); Zaring, supra note 121, at 520 (citing evidence 
of how private sector employers market their own former federal prosecutors to prospective clients 
and stating: “[t]he right way to signal worth to private prospective employers may be, among en-
forcement officials, at least, aggressive pursuit of wrongdoing while in the public sector”). 
 129 For instance, a chief prosecutor seeking to prioritize prosecutions of violent crimes and drug-
trafficking may face resistance among prosecutors seeking to burnish their complex white-collar crime 
credentials. Likewise, a chief prosecutor seeking to generate greater numbers of indictments and con-
victions may face resistance among prosecutors looking to invest themselves in time-consuming, risk-
prone trials. 
 130 GRUBER, supra note 104, at 101–20, 113 (“Far from accepting democratically elected officials 
as legitimate agents of [bureaucratic] control[,] . . . [bureaucrats see] themselves as upholding democ-
racy against the particularistic incursions of these individuals. In bureaucratic eyes, mayors, board 
members, and members of the city council are not elected leaders of the citizenry, but rather politi-
cians. And politicians are surely not the people to uphold democracy.”). 
 131 See, e.g., STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF STREET CRIME: CRIMINAL PROCESS AND 
CULTURAL OBSESSION 56 (1991) (“[Police officers’] basic distrust of politics is rooted in the firmly 
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ed or politically appointed leaders, nor the political whims of the public, but to 
the law itself. 
In line with this view, career criminal enforcers tend to see the objects of 
reform—namely, penalties and particular enforcement strategies—as necessary 
tools of their apolitical work. In their assessment, high penalties and reduced 
judicial sentencing discretion are needed to induce cooperation by accomplices 
and ensure uniform application of the law;132 the prosecution of lower-level 
offenses is necessary to build cases up the culpability ladder;133 and stop and 
frisk and other forms of order-maintenance policing are necessary to deter and 
disrupt open-air drug markets and illegal firearm possession (and attendant 
risks of violence).134 Viewed through this lens, public pressure to reduce man-
datory minimums and enlarge judicial sentencing discretion, to divert rather 
than prosecute minor drug possession, and to curb aggressive stop and frisk 
practices is a misguided politicization of apolitical enforcement tools. Career 
                                                                                                                           
held belief that politics poses a dual threat to police professionalism. Politicians are seen as outsiders 
intent on pandering to the public or doing favors for the influential. . . . This congenital inclination of 
elected officials to curry favor is believed at the very least to interfere with even-handed law enforce-
ment . . . . Second, politicians are perceived as amateurs who . . . simply do not understand law en-
forcement.”). 
 132 See Letter from Robert Gay Guthrie, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Assistant U.S. Att’ys to Hon. 
Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.naausa.org/site/
index.php/resources/letters/41-jan-2014-letter-to-ag-on-mandatory-minimums/file (expressing disa-
greement with the Attorney General’s decision to support legislation that weakens mandatory mini-
mums); Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of U.S. Att’ys et al. to Hon. Charles E. Grassley, Chair, Comm. on 
the Judiciary & Hon. Dianne Feinstein, Ranking Member, Comm. on the Judiciary (Nov. 2, 2017), 
https://www.naausa.org/site/index.php/resources/letters/143-nov-2017-letter-opposing-srca-2017/file 
(opposing legislation that ultimately would become The First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-391, 
because “[t]he legislation undermines mandatory minimum penalties for drug trafficking and weakens 
the tools that law enforcement authorities need . . . [and] it will make it more difficult for law en-
forcement to pursue the most culpable drug dealers and secure their cooperation to pursue others”); 
see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PEN-
ALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, App’x G, G6–7 (May 27, 2010) [hereinafter 
Testimony of David Hiller] (capturing the testimony of David Hiller, National Vice President of the 
National Fraternal Order of Police, showing support for mandatory minimum sentencing). 
 133 See Testimony of David Hiller, supra note 132, at G6 (arguing that mandatory minimums 
induce criminals to provide evidence against others involved in their criminal operations in exchange 
for reduced punishment); see also Joseph Goldstein, Undercover Officers Ask Addicts to Buy Drugs, 
Snaring Them but Not Dealers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/05/
nyregion/undercover-officers-ask-addicts-to-buy-drugs-snaring-them-but-not-dealers.html [https://
perma.cc/WR9W-VRBN] (tracing divergence in views on the utility of “buy-and-bust” tactics be-
tween the New York City mayor and the Manhattan District Attorney on the one hand, and the NYPD 
Narcotics Division Chief on the other). 
 134 See Daniel Bergner, Is Stop-and-Frisk Worth It?, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 2014), https://www.
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/04/is-stop-and-frisk-worth-it/358644 [https://perma.cc/T42D-
XPM3] (profiling two Newark police officers and their views on stop and frisk). 
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enforcers, most of whom began their careers well into the 1990s,135 did not 
experience the political shift that created those tools136—and so they do not see 
them as the product of earlier political choices.137 Moreover, those earlier 
choices are often depicted as technocratic policy making, masking the implicit 
political judgments such policy making entails.138 
Interestingly, the stiff penalty regime birthed by those earlier political 
choices also met with some bureaucratic resistance at the time. Frank Bowman 
and Michael Heise’s study of federal prosecutors’ response to the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines for drug offenses found an above-average use of discretion-
ary tools that resulted in a systematic lowering of drug sentences in the 1990s, 
beginning five years after the Guidelines went into effect. They describe a 
world in which: 
[P]rosecutors and judges have slipped the traces of the Guidelines en 
masse. Many regularly substitute their personal moral compass, or 
their pragmatic judgment of what is fitting in a particular case, for the 
judgment expressed by the guidelines. Many have reverted to local 
norms and legal folkways, establishing sentencing practices based on 
Guidelines rules but full of local idiosyncrasy. Some, like the U.S. At-
torneys of the Mexican border districts, have consciously seceded 
from the Guidelines regime, declaring unilaterally that local condi-
tions entitle them to disregard national law.139 
                                                                                                                           
 135 The minimum service requirement for pension vesting for most state and local law enforce-
ment agencies is twenty to twenty-five years, with the minimum qualifying age at fifty or fifty-five. 
REAVES, supra note 122, at 19. This means that officers retiring in 2018 after twenty-five years of 
service would have begun their careers in 1993. And given that hiring in state and local police de-
partments has outpaced retirement, most officers employed today are not so close to retirement. See 
id. at 6, 16. 
 136 FORMAN, supra note 69, at 125–50 (describing the rise of mandatory minimums and the use of 
order-maintenance policing in the late 1980s and early 1990s). 
 137 Id. (discussing law enforcement voices in the 1980s and early 1990s who argued against the 
adoption of mandatory minimum penalties and other “tough on crime” tactics); MILLER, supra note 
78, at 121–60 (framing investment in crime-reduction measures without co-equal investment in vio-
lence prevention measures as political choices). 
 138 See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Systems Fallacy: A Genealogy and Critique of Public Policy 
and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 47 J. LEGAL STUD. 419, 419–21, 428–31 (2018) (arguing that systems 
analysis, a decision-making technique that has driven American policy making in the postwar period, 
disguises implicit political choices in a technical cost-benefit analysis, using criminal justice policies 
adopted in New York City in the 1970s as an example). 
 139 Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of Declin-
ing Federal Drug Sentences Including Data from the District Level, 87 IOWA L. REV. 477, 560 
(2002). The authors found that federal prosecutors learned to use a variety of discretionary tools in 
resolving cases that served to lower the applicable Guidelines’ penalties at sentencing. Id. at 559. The 
five-year delay between the beginning of the federal Guidelines regime and the observable penalty 
decline in drug cases was thus probably a function of (i) the time lapse between case resolution and 
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Similarly, as Issa-Kohler Hausmann has observed, felony drug arrests in 
New York declined in the years following the enactment of New York’s fa-
mously draconian Rockefeller drug laws; the massive upswing in felony drug 
arrests and imprisonment many observers attribute to those laws did not in fact 
occur until a decade after the laws’ enactment;140 in the interim, New York po-
lice and prosecutors seem to have either ignored the laws or worked to subvert 
them. There is even more direct evidence of bureaucratic flouting by local 
prosecutors in response to three-strikes laws,141 as well as by line officers to 
the community policing movement of the early 1990s.142 
This brings us to the third factor motivating line enforcers’ resistance to a 
leader’s reform-oriented agenda: deference to the status quo, whatever it may 
be. Career enforcers came of professional age in the existing criminal en-
forcement space and have executed their duties within that space; and they see 
those duties, and that space, as worthy of continuation. In the language of so-
cial psychology, they exhibit system justification—a motivated rationalization 
of an existing political, economic, institutional, or other social arrangement as 
fair and legitimate.143 
System justification builds on two related social-identity theories. The 
first, ego justification, emphasizes the tendency to validate, justify, and legiti-
mate one’s self in order to maintain a favorable self-image. The second, group 
justification, highlights the tendency to defend and justify the behaviors of the 
social group to which one belongs in order to maintain favorable images of 
one’s own group. System justification in turn postulates that people who oper-
ate within a system will rationalize that system regardless of its epistemic mor-
                                                                                                                           
sentencing—cases already resolved at the time of the Guidelines’ adoption were less amenable to 
discretionary reductions—and (ii) the time it took for prosecutors to learn the hidden discretionary 
pathways within the Guidelines system. 
 140 Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Jumping Bunnies and Legal Rules: The Organizational Sociologist 
and the Legal Scholar Should Be Friends, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 246, 254–55 
(Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017). 
 141 See, e.g., James Austin et al., “Three Strikes and You’re Out”: The Implementation and Im-
pact of Strike Laws 1, 8, 107 (Mar. 6, 2000) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/181297.pdf (finding, in a study of three-strikes laws in Washington State, Califor-
nia, and Georgia, little change in prosecution and sentencing patterns in all but two California coun-
ties, in part as a function of prosecutorial and judicial resistance to the new laws). See generally Roger 
A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1253 (2011) (describing charging dec-
linations arising out of prosecutors’ disagreement with a law as an example of “prosecutorial nullifica-
tion”). 
 142 See, e.g., Todd J. Dicker, Tension on the Thin Blue Line: Police Officer Resistance to Com-
munity-Oriented Policing, 23 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 59, 69–71 (1998) (finding that 54% of surveyed 
police officers thought community policing was just a public relations effort, 26% thought it merely a 
fad, and 12% believed it does not work). 
 143 John T. Jost & Jojanneke van der Toorn, System Justification Theory, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
POWER 649, 650 (Keith Dowding ed., 2011). 
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al value or even its personal benefits to them.144 System justification is bol-
stered when it has the effect of validating one’s own self-image or that of one’s 
social group.145 
Enforcement leaders, of course, can share career enforcers’ fidelity to an 
apolitical mission, reluctance to forsake valuable enforcement tools, and sup-
port for the status quo. But among leaders, each of these tendencies will be far 
less pronounced. Elected and appointed leaders must always balance the mis-
sion of dispensing justice according to law with the mission of providing polit-
ically responsive criminal justice. In this vein, they will be more willing than 
career enforcers to consider the public ramifications of particular enforcement 
tools. 
Leaders will also be more open than career enforcers to challenging the 
status quo. As system justification theory recognizes, people are members of 
more than one system. But defending one of these systems at the expense of 
another creates a psychological need to reduce cognitive dissonance among 
competing system justification motives.146 Enforcement leaders are active par-
ticipants of two systems: the criminal justice system they help lead, and the 
democratic system through which they were elected or appointed. Thus, to the 
extent these systems begin to diverge—as happens when voter preferences 
about criminal justice policy change—leaders must find ways to align them. 
This insight in part explains why enforcement leaders in recent years have 
framed criminal justice reform as a matter of system-preservation: for the 
criminal justice system to continue to function effectively, it must consider the 
costs—to the system—of tough-on-crime policies.147 
                                                                                                                           
 144 John T. Jost & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Role of Stereotyping in System-Justification and the 
Production of False Consciousness, 33 BRITISH J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (1994); John T. Jost & Orsolya 
Hunyady, The Psychology of System Justification and the Palliative Function of Ideology, 13 EUR. 
REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 111, 121 (2002). 
 145 See Jost & Hunyady, supra note 144, at 121 (stating that motives for ego justification and 
group justification may complement the motives for system justification). See generally Jost & Banaji, 
supra note 144. 
 146 Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implications for Law, 
Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1119, 1149 (2006). 
 147 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Eric Holder Delivers Re-
marks at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-delivers-remarks-annual-meeting-
american-bar-associations [https://perma.cc/8RHE-ERGB] (“We need to keep taking steps to make 
sure people feel safe and secure in their homes and communities. And part of that means doing some-
thing about the lives being harmed, not helped, by a criminal justice system that doesn’t serve the 
American people as well as it should.”); Ryan Lizza, Why Sally Yates Stood Up to Trump, NEW 
YORKER (May 22, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/29/why-sally-yates-stood-
up-to-trump [https://perma.cc/YLH5-C8CB] (Deputy Attorney General Loretta Lynch recalling, in 
response to Attorney General Holder’s 2014 initiative to move away from draconian penalties in 
smaller federal drug cases, “[m]any senior Assistant U.S. Attorneys initially said, ‘What is this? Are 
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These features of the criminal enforcement bureaucracy—principal-agent 
diffusion and a divergence between leaders and career enforcers in both goals 
and motivations—fuel a conceptual divide between leadership and the rank-
and-file. It is a divide reflected in the literature on organizational culture in 
police and prosecutors’ offices,148 qualitative surveys of police and prosecu-
tors’ attitudes,149 and anecdotal reports of reform-resistance among career en-
forcers.150 And in a system in which leaders necessarily cede autonomy and 
discretion to those in their employ, it is a divide that ultimately stymies respon-
siveness to public demands for change. 
C. The Sovereign 
On top of the relationships between voting constituencies and criminal 
enforcement leadership, and between that leadership and the rank-and-file, we 
must now add a third pivotal feature of our democracy and its effect on the 
criminal enforcement bureaucracy’s responsiveness: federalism. 
                                                                                                                           
you saying that I was doing something wrong for doing my job before?’” and responding that the 
system would benefit by allocating prosecutorial resources according to greatest impact); James 
O’Neill, A Question That Cries Out to Be Answered: New York City’s Police Commissioner on the 
Killing of Jessica White and His Vision of Neighborhood Policing, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 12, 2016), 
https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/james-o-neill-question-cries-answered-article-1.2828533 
[https://perma.cc/EC94-U6JN] (excerpting remarks delivered by New York City Police Commission-
er James O’Neill linking improved police responsiveness to, and respect of, local communities with 
increased community cooperation in fighting crime). 
 148 See generally CARTER, supra note 56 (documenting challenges of placing top-down con-
straints on line prosecutor decision making); REUSS-IANNI, supra note 56 (finding, in a two-year 
study of social organization in the New York City Police Department, significant distinctions in pro-
fessional culture between management and line officers). The dearth of more recent empirical work in 
this area only further confirms the need for renewed scholarly attention to this divide. See generally 
supra Part I. 
 149 MORIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 30–31 (showing differences between leadership and rank-and-
file officers on measures such as pride and fulfillment in work, and weak support for leadership 
among rank-and-file, particularly in large departments). See generally BESIKI LUKA KUTATELADZE 
ET AL., PROSECUTORIAL ATTITUDES, PERSPECTIVES, AND PRIORITIES: INSIGHTS FROM THE INSIDE: 
ADVANCING PROSECUTORIAL EFFECTIVENESS AND FAIRNESS REPORT SERIES (Dec. 2018), https://
caj.fiu.edu/news/2018/prosecutorial-attitudes-perspectives-and-priorities-insights-from-the-inside/
report-1.pdf (finding, in a survey of local prosecutors from four offices with newly elected, reform-
oriented leaders—in Chicago, Jacksonville, Milwaukee, and Tampa—attitudinal resistance among 
mid-level managers and line prosecutors to changes by leadership). 
 150 Harry Bruinius, More and More, Push for Police Reform Starts with the Chief, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2016/1018/More-and-more-
push-for-police-reform-starts-with-the-chief [https://perma.cc/83DG-ATYS] (discussing resistance 
among rank-and-file police officers to police chiefs’ efforts at reform); June Williams, Seattle Cops 
Challenge Department of Justice, COURTHOUSE NEWS (June 2, 2014), https://www.courthousenews.
com/seattle-cops-challenge-department-of-justice/ [https://perma.cc/4Y98-J9SJ] (recounting a legal 
challenge mounted by a group of over a hundred Seattle Police Department officers against a Seattle 
Police Department consent decree with the DOJ on the use of force reforms). 
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Among the arenas of state regulatory power, criminal enforcement gives 
rise to unique relationships between sovereigns. States enact criminal laws, but 
localities primarily enforce them. Congress has nearly co-extensive authority 
over criminal law, yet limited resources to effectuate it. Though federal and 
local enforcement authority can and often do overlap, such enforcement may 
be independent or coordinated, a function entirely of sovereigns’ choices. At 
the same time, federal authorities have powers—through oversight, spending, 
and the Supremacy Clause—to mold state and local criminal enforcement, al-
beit within resource limits. 
Each of these dynamics has effects on political responsiveness and, in 
turn, bureaucratic decision making. Subsection 1 considers the effects of allo-
cations of lawmaking and enforcement authority,151 while Subsection 2 con-
siders the effects of inter-jurisdictional cooperation and oversight in criminal 
enforcement.152 
1. Making Law 
At the state level, criminal laws are made primarily by state legisla-
tures.153 Criminal enforcement, though, occurs almost entirely at the local lev-
el, by way of police and district attorneys. As discussed in Part II.A, public 
preferences on criminal justice are most clearly expressed at the local level.154 
This means that calls for change will be most clearly and audibly directed at 
local actors: the police and prosecutors who bring penal codes to life. 
This can create internal tension within enforcement institutions. Line-
level police and prosecutors envision themselves as law enforcers rather than 
policymakers.155 They may be reluctant to engage in forbearance. And they 
may see themselves as guardians of the justice system, protecting it from polit-
ical whim.156 These dynamics played out visibly in the Philadelphia District 
Attorney’s Office following the 2017 election of Larry Krasner, where line 
prosecutors bristled at new charging policies they perceived as too lenient.157 
                                                                                                                           
 151 See infra notes 153–180 and accompanying text. 
 152 See infra notes 181–208 and accompanying text. 
 153 The exceptions are laws enacted by statewide referenda, a relatively rarely-used method of 
penal lawmaking. 
 154 See supra Part II.A. 
 155 See supra notes 130–136 and accompanying text. 
 156 See supra notes 130–136 and accompanying text. 
 157 See Chris Palmer, Philly DA Larry Krasner Is Changing the Way His Office Prosecutes Kill-
ers. Not Everyone Agrees, PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 4, 2018), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/
crime/philadelphia-district-attorney-larry-krasner-homicide-prosecutions-lifers-anthony-voci-2018
0404.html [https://perma.cc/VW7M-6FW3] (discussing internal resistance among line prosecutors to 
Krasner’s policy of refraining from charging mandatory penalty-carrying homicide crimes in cases 
involving homicide in order to allow for lower sentences). 
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They have also manifested in police rank-and-file resistance to a variety of ini-
tiatives, from diversionary programs to categorical prosecutorial declinations.158 
It can also create tensions with state-level actors accountable to different 
political constituencies. Those tensions have occasionally risen to the surface, 
as when governors or state attorneys general have sought to remove jurisdic-
tion over certain cases from local prosecutors whom they believe are not duly 
enforcing the state’s laws.159 In fact, most states provide the governor and at-
torney general with broad authority to intervene in local prosecutors’ cases, or 
to usurp or reassign local prosecutors’ jurisdiction.160 This authority has histor-
ically been exercised sparingly.161 But it may become increasingly prevalent in 
states where voters’ criminal justice preferences are markedly divergent, and 
                                                                                                                           
 158 MELISSA REULAND & JASON CHENEY, POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, ENHANCING SUC-
CESS OF POLICE-BASED DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 12 (May 2005), 
https://www.evawintl.org/Library/DocumentLibraryHandler.ashx?id=495 [https://perma.cc/3YC5-
QZZY] (discussing “difficulties obtaining officer buy-in and trust” reported by some police depart-
ments attempting to implement diversionary programs for the mentally ill); JENNIFER A. TALLON ET 
AL., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, CREATING OFF-RAMPS: A NATIONAL REVIEW OF POLICE-LED 
DIVERSION PROGRAMS 54, 56 (2018), https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/
document/2018/Creating_Off_Ramps.pdf (discussing line officer resistance to a misdemeanor diver-
sion program in Durham County, North Carolina in part because, according to an Assistant Chief of 
Police, “[g]iving people a pass is not the norm for this group [i.e., police] culture anywhere in the 
country”); Shaila Dewan, A Growing Chorus of Big City Prosecutors Says No to Marijuana Convic-
tions, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/29/us/baltimore-marijuana-
possession.html [https://perma.cc/5VRX-6EWB] (“Police departments and unions have sometimes 
put up resistance to these broad uses of prosecutor discretion [to cease charging marijuana possession 
cases], saying they defy the intent of lawmakers.”). For examples of bureaucratic resistance to in-
creases in penal severity, see generally supra notes 139 & 141 and accompanying text. 
 159 See, e.g., Ayala v. Scott, 224 So. 3d 755, 759 (Fla. 2017) (upholding the Governor’s authority 
to reassign all death-eligible cases from a local elected prosecutor who announced her intention not to 
seek the death penalty in any case); Williams v. State, 184 So. 3d 908, 917 (Miss. 2014) (holding an 
Attorney General’s attempt to usurp prosecutorial authority over a homicide case that the local district 
attorney declined to prosecute to be unauthorized under the law, where the Governor did not direct the 
Attorney General to intervene); Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E.2d 1002, 1007 (N.Y. 1997) (upholding the 
Governor’s broad authority to reassign a death-eligible case from Bronx District Attorney Robert 
Johnson based on the Governor’s belief that Johnson “was a threat to faithful execution of the death 
penalty law”). 
 160 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 4 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.3(e) (4th ed. 2019) (“[M]ost 
states allow the Attorney General to intervene in a local prosecution. About half the states give the 
Attorney General broad authority to intervene on his own initiative, while some others allow interven-
tion only at the direction or request of another official.”); Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal 
Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 551–56 (2011) (surveying 
broad grants of statutory or constitutional authority to state attorneys general to intervene in local 
prosecutions); Tyler Quinn Yeargain, Comment, Discretion Versus Supersession: Calibrating the 
Power Balance Between Local Prosecutors and State Officials, 68 EMORY L.J. 95, 110–26 (2018) 
(fifty-state survey finding varying degrees of power among state officials to usurp jurisdiction from 
local district attorneys). 
 161 See Barkow, supra note 160, at 550–56 (discussing rare invocation by most attorneys general 
of their broad grants of criminal prosecutorial power). 
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that divergence begins to manifest in locally elected prosecutors’ exercise of 
enforcement discretion. In Pennsylvania, for example, the legislature recently 
expanded the State Attorney General’s jurisdiction to prosecute cases charging 
violations of the state’s firearms laws, tellingly limiting the jurisdictional expan-
sion to the city of Philadelphia for two years only—effectively curtailing the 
discretion of District Attorney Krasner for the duration of his current term.162 
At the federal level, lawmaking and enforcement are not separated across 
sovereigns. But federal criminal law is vast,163 enforcement resources relatively 
limited,164 and enforcement discretion largely unconstrained by public safety 
imperatives.165 As a result, the real “makers” of federal criminal law have long 
been congressional appropriations committees and DOJ leadership. The former 
determine which DOJ components to fund, at what levels, and for what purpos-
es,166 while the latter sets prosecutorial priorities and, more critically, shapes 
how congressional appropriations committees perceive enforcement needs.167 
Although this method of federal criminal “lawmaking” is not separated 
across sovereigns, it is still separated, to a degree, between Washington and the 
districts. When DOJ leaders stray from the enforcement status quo—whether 
to increase or decrease penal severity, or to focus on a new set of priorities—
line prosecutors and agents in field offices can be slow to execute those chang-
es. Attorney General John Ashcroft’s 2003 directive to prosecutors to charge 
the highest penalty-generating readily provable offense met with uneven im-
plementation,168 as did Attorney General Eric Holder’s 2013 directive to re-
frain from charging mandatory penalty-carrying offenses in certain categories 
                                                                                                                           
 162 See H.B. 1614, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019); Akela Lacy & Ryan Grim, Pennsyl-
vania Lawmakers Move to Strip Reformist Prosecutor Larry Krasner of Authority, THE INTERCEPT (July 
8, 2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/07/08/da-larry-krasner-pennsylvania-attorney-general/ [https://
perma.cc/DBG4-LWPX]. Attorney General Shapiro, a Democrat, has since been under pressure to re-
nounce the law and the power it grants him. Akela Lacy, Pennsylvania Attorney General Josh Shapiro 
Will Support Repeal of Controversial Law Stripping Larry Krasner of Authority, THE INTERCEPT (July 
12, 2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/07/12/josh-shapiro-larry-krasner-pennsylvania-repeal-hb-1614/ 
[https://perma.cc/92PG-NULU]. 
 163 Richman, supra note 101, at 81–91 (documenting the expansion of federal criminal law over 
the past century). 
 164 Id. 
 165 See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 128, at 599–618 (arguing that local prosecutors’ heighten-
ing political accountability relative to their federal counterparts comparatively diminishes their charg-
ing discretion). 
 166 See Richman, supra note 50, at 793–99 (discussing the influence of congressional appropria-
tions on DOJ priorities). 
 167 Ouziel, supra note 28; Richman, supra note 50, at 793–99. 
 168 See Richman, supra note 19, at 2067–68 (suggesting that the Ashcroft Memorandum had little 
to no effect on line prosecutors’ behavior). 
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of cases.169 More than shirking but less than sabotage,170 these reactions by 
line prosecutors in the districts to Main Justice directives are a form of bureau-
cratic shoulder-shrugging—an almost reflexive disinterest in the goals and as-
pirations of transient, politically-oriented leadership.171 (This contrasts with the 
sort of prosecutions directly overseen by political appointees at Main Justice, 
which can, though do not always, ebb and flow in sync with administration 
changeover.)172 
Of course, shoulder-shrugging may not always come to pass, as recent re-
ports from the border would seem to indicate.173 But career immigration en-
forcement agents’ apparent eagerness (or at least willingness) to implement a 
new immigration enforcement policy may be explained, at least in part, by 
                                                                                                                           
 169 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 32, at 11–14 (finding that twenty-one percent 
of districts did not update their local policies in accordance with Attorney General Holder’s directive); 
Stephanie Holmes Didwania, (How Much) Do Mandatory Minimums Matter? 17–18, 23–24 (Jan. 
2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (in empirical study of effects of Holder directive, 
finding directive resulted in 40% reduction in the number of defendants facing a mandatory minimum 
among those eligible, with over one-third of potentially eligible defendants charged with a mandatory 
penalty-carrying offense). 
 170 See JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE: BUREAUCRATIC 
RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 22 (1997) (conceptualizing “shirking” as motivated by either 
leisure-seeking or political disagreement, and “sabotage” as working in order to deliberately under-
mine the policy goals of the principal). 
 171 See supra Part II.B.2. 
 172 See Kitty Calavita, The Struggle for Racial Justice: The Personal, the Political, and . . . the 
Economic, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 495, 499 (2010) (noting a decrease in federal civil rights prosecu-
tions under the Bush Administration as compared to the Clinton Administration); Rachel Harmon, 
Limited Leverage: Federal Remedies and Policing Reform, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 33, 48 
(2012) (noting a rise in federal civil rights prosecutions under the Obama Administration); Ben 
Protess et al., Trump Administration Spares Corporate Wrongdoers Billions in Penalties, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/03/us/trump-sec-doj-corporate-penalties.html [https://
perma.cc/CM7R-KKWL] (reporting a seventy-two percent decline in corporate penalties assessed 
from federal corporate prosecutions under the Trump Administration). 
 173 See Exec. Order No. 13,768: Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, 82 
Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-
order-enhancing-public-safety-interior-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/G3AR-KQTA] (“The purpose 
of this order is to direct executive departments and agencies . . . to employ all lawful means to enforce 
the immigration laws of the United States.”); U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 
2017 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 1–2, https://www.ice.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/Report/2017/iceEndOfYearFY2017.pdf (revealing a thirty percent increase in 
administrative arrests by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in fiscal year 2017, fol-
lowing President Trump’s January 25, 2017, Executive Order and a Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) February 20, 2017, memorandum implementing the Executive Order). But see U.S. BORDER 
PATROL, TOTAL ILLEGAL ALIEN APPREHENSIONS BY MONTH, https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/
assets/documents/2019-Mar/bp-total-monthly-apps-sector-area-fy2018.pdf (documenting illegal alien 
apprehensions by U.S. Border Patrol from fiscal years 2000 to 2018, and reporting a twenty-five per-
cent decline in total apprehensions between fiscal years 2016 and 2017, from 415,816 apprehensions 
between September 2015 and September 2016, to 310,531 apprehensions between September 2016 
and September 2017, followed by an increase in fiscal year 2018, to 404,142 apprehensions). 
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their agency’s comparatively narrower mission, as well as its institutional 
placement (within DHS, not the DOJ).174 Notably, while arrests and removals 
of undocumented immigrants rose substantially in fiscal year 2017, criminal 
immigration prosecutions—that is, criminal cases initiated by federal prosecu-
tors for violations of immigration law—fell by 2% over the same period and 
comprised a smaller percentage of all federal criminal cases.175 This decline in 
criminal filing occurred despite Attorney General Sessions’ directive to priori-
tize immigration cases.176 Even after the announcement of a “zero-tolerance” 
policy for illegal border crossings following a surge in illegal border crossings 
in the first quarter of 2018,177 the reaction by prosecutors in border districts has 
been mixed.178 This trend has persisted as both border apprehensions and im-
migration prosecutions continued at a heightened pace through the remainder 
of 2018.179 What’s more, there has been virtually no change in the ratio of 
prosecutions to border apprehensions, which has hovered at around 1:3 over 
the last twenty years.180 There are, it appears, two stories of bureaucracy relat-
                                                                                                                           
 174 See History, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.ice.gov/
history [https://perma.cc/8VSS-MYLH] (explaining that ICE’s stated mission is to “promote home-
land security and public safety through the criminal and civil enforcement of federal laws governing 
border control, customs, trade and immigration”). 
 175 See U.S. District Courts: Judicial Business 2017, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
statistics-reports/us-district-courts-judicial-business-2017 [https://perma.cc/NCX6-6UZ2] (“Criminal 
filings for defendants charged with [felony and Class A misdemeanor] immigration offenses fell 2 
percent to 20,438 and accounted for 27 percent of criminal filings. This was the lowest total since 
2007.”). Petty immigration offenses—most commonly, illegal entry—fell by twenty-two percent in 
2017. Compare Judicial Business 2016 Tables, U.S. COURTS tbl.M-2, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/data_tables/jb_m2_0930.2016.pdf (reporting 47,962 petty immigration offenses between 
September 2015 and September 2016), with Judicial Business 2017 Tables, U.S. COURTS tbl.M-2 
[hereinafter Judicial Business 2017 Tables], https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/
jb_m2_0930.2017.pdf (reporting 37,151 petty immigration offenses between September 2016 and 
September 2017). 
 176 See Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All 
Fed. Prosecutors (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/956841/download. 
 177 See Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All 
Fed. Prosecutors Along the Southwest Border (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/1049751/download. 
 178 See “Zero Tolerance” at the Border: Rhetoric vs. Reality, TRAC IMMIGRATION (July 24, 
2018), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/520/#f4 [https://perma.cc/NB8H-7WG3] (tabulating a 
forty-five percent rise in prosecutions arising from border apprehensions between March and May 
2018, but showing vast differences among the five southwest border districts, with the only significant 
increase confined to the Southern District of Texas). 
 179 Compare Judicial Business 2017 Tables, supra note 175, at tbl.M-2, with Judicial Business 
2018 Tables, U.S. COURTS tbl.M-2 [hereinafter Judicial Business 2018 Tables], https://www.uscourts.
gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_m2_0930.2018.pdf (documenting a 215% rise in petty immigra-
tion prosecutions in 2018, with by far the biggest rise in prosecutions occurring in the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas). 
 180 See TRAC IMMIGRATION, supra note 178, at fig.1 (showing that criminal prosecutions have 
accounted for around one third of all Border Patrol apprehensions in the past twenty years); see also 
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ed to changing immigration priorities set at the political level—one of acquies-
cence or perhaps even encouragement, the other of resistance or, more simply, 
disregard. 
In sum, the division of criminal lawmaking and enforcement power at the 
state level, and the allocation of criminal enforcement authority at the federal 
level, are structural features that tend to enable, and may even exacerbate, re-
sistance to political change. 
2. Cooperation and Oversight 
Nearly complete overlap between state and federal criminal law,181 cou-
pled with the limited yet potent reach of federal criminal enforcement pow-
er,182 has, over the last half-century, spawned both inter-jurisdictional coopera-
tion and oversight.183 But in moments of political transition on criminal justice 
preferences, each of these features of criminal federalism can disrupt emerging 
local political consensus. They can function, in effect, as escape valves from 
the pressures of democracy. 
Consider cooperation. When criminal justice preferences are well-settled 
among local constituencies, federal intervention in local criminal enforcement 
functions as a form of aid-in-kind, helping localities to better implement ma-
joritarian constituent preferences.184 When those preferences begin to shift, the 
shifts manifest less overtly in the federal electoral sphere, creating divergence 
between state and federal laws, or between local and federal enforcement poli-
cies, or both.185 In this environment, local enforcers can turn to federal enforc-
ers to avoid executing reforms with which they disagree. 
This is precisely what took place in the early years of medical marijuana 
legalization. In a number of states that legalized the use and distribution of ma-
rijuana for medical purposes, local law enforcement, municipal leaders, and 
civic leaders asked federal prosecutors and drug enforcement agents to warn 
marijuana dispensaries that their actions were in violation of federal law. Fed-
eral enforcers complied with these requests, sending warning letters to nearly 
two thousand dispensaries in four states advising that the dispensaries should 
                                                                                                                           
U.S. BORDER PATROL, TOTAL ILLEGAL ALIEN APPREHENSIONS BY MONTH, supra note 173 (docu-
menting 404,142 apprehensions in fiscal year 2018); Judicial Business 2018 Tables, supra note 179, at 
tbls.M-2 & D-3 (documenting a total of 103,367 prosecutions for felony and misdemeanor illegal 
entry or reentry offenses). 
 181 Richman, supra note 101, at 81, 91–96. 
 182 See Lauren M. Ouziel, Legitimacy and Federal Criminal Enforcement Power, 123 YALE L.J. 
2236 (2014) (discussing the sources of federal relative to state and local criminal enforcement power). 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
 185 See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the relative non-responsiveness of federal politics to local 
criminal justice preferences). 
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cease distributing marijuana and that failure to do so could result in federal 
prosecution.186 Most dispensaries that received such warnings closed in re-
sponse, but those that did not were in some instances subjected to fairly robust 
federal prosecution and civil forfeiture—again, largely at the behest of local 
enforcement officials.187 By 2013, after Colorado and Washington legalized 
marijuana for recreational purposes, the Obama Administration finally adopted 
a policy of encouraging greater restraint in the enforcement of federal marijua-
na prohibitions in states where the drug was legal.188 Known as the “Cole 
Memorandum,” the directive hardly provoked a sea change in federal marijua-
na enforcement,189 nor was that its design.190 In this respect, Attorney General 
Sessions’ January 2018 rescission of the Cole Memorandum was enforcement 
                                                                                                                           
 186 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-1, STATE MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION: 
DOJ SHOULD DOCUMENT ITS APPROACH TO MONITORING THE EFFECTS OF LEGALIZATION 34 (2015) 
[hereinafter STATE MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION], https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674464.pdf. 
 187 Id. at 34–35 & n.52 (describing a coordinated campaign by California’s four U.S. Attorneys 
offices (USAOs) to crack down on medical marijuana dispensaries, which included twenty-six civil 
forfeiture actions and warranted searches of over one hundred dispensaries in the Central District of 
California alone). 
 188 See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All U.S. 
Att’ys (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf; see 
also Mike Riggs, Obama’s War on Pot, THE NATION (Oct. 30, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/
article/obamas-war-pot/ [https://perma.cc/K9FJ-H78D] (discussing the evolution of the Obama Ad-
ministration’s marijuana enforcement in face of rising legalization at the state level). 
 189 See STATE MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra note 186, at 35–37 (discussing limited effects 
of policy change). This is borne out by the numbers. In Colorado, for example, the 2013 Main Justice 
directive produced no detectable change in the number of federal marijuana prosecutions: federal 
prosecutors brought an average of eleven marijuana cases in the three years preceding the directive, 
and eleven in the three years following it. Compare U.S. District Courts: Judicial Business 2010 Ta-
bles, U.S. COURTS tbl.D-3 [hereinafter Judicial Business 2010 Tables], https://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/D03DSep10.pdf, U.S. District Courts: Judicial Business 2011 
Tables, U.S. COURTS tbl.D-3 [hereinafter Judicial Business 2011 Tables], https://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/D03DSep11.pdf, and U.S. District Courts: Judicial Business 
2012 Tables, U.S. COURTS tbl.D-3 [hereinafter Judicial Business 2012 Tables], https://www.uscourts.
gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/D03DSep12.pdf, with U.S. District Courts: Judicial Busi-
ness 2014 Tables, U.S. COURTS tbl.D-3 [hereinafter Judicial Business 2014 Tables], https://www.
uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/D03DSep14.pdf, U.S. District Courts: Judicial 
Business 2015 Tables, U.S. COURTS tbl.D-3 [hereinafter Judicial Business 2015 Tables], https://www.
uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/D03Sep15.pdf, and U.S. District Courts: Judicial Business 
2016 Tables, U.S. COURTS tbl.D-3 [hereinafter Judicial Business 2016 Tables], https://www.uscourts.
gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_d3_0930.2016.pdf. The state of Washington saw a twenty-six 
percent decline in the number of marijuana cases brought during that same time period—from an 
average of eighty-six to an average of sixty-three cases. Compare Judicial Business 2010 Tables, 
supra, at tbl.D-3, Judicial Business 2011 Tables, supra, at tbl.D-3, and Judicial Business 2012 Tables, 
supra, at tbl.D-3, with Judicial Business 2014 Tables, supra, at tbl.D-3, Judicial Business 2015 Ta-
bles, supra, at tbl.D-3, and Judicial Business 2016 Tables, supra, at tbl.D-3. 
 190 See STATE MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra note 186, at 10–11 (observing similarities be-
tween the Cole Memorandum and prior DOJ guidance on marijuana enforcement). 
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theatre.191 Most federal prosecutors have, and will continue to, enforce mariju-
ana laws in line with resource constraints and local priorities, as identified 
through communication and collaboration with local law enforcement.192 
Federal oversight of local criminal justice bureaucracies plays an even 
more complicated role in transitional moments. Like cooperation, oversight 
can function as an escape valve of sorts, relieving local political pressure on 
bureaucracies. But at the same time, it can also fuel political transitions. 
This is what has happened with policing. At a time of increasing public 
attention to police misuse of force and racial disparities in the numbers of po-
lice-citizen interactions, the DOJ’s investigations of local police departments 
for individual or systemic violations of federal constitutional or statutory 
law193 can take political pressure off of local officials by outsourcing both the 
investigation of these problems and prescriptions for their cure.194 At the same 
time, by further revealing and publicizing the extent of these problems, pattern 
and practice investigations can turn up the temperature on an already volatile 
political issue. And, if a resolution to the investigation (whether by agreement 
or consent decree) is either not forthcoming or proves ultimately ineffective, 
the pressure on local political figures rises. 
                                                                                                                           
 191 See Sessions Memorandum, Jan. 2018, supra note 117. 
 192 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney Bob Troyer Issues Statement Regarding 
Marijuana Prosecutions in Colorado (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-co/pr/us-attorney-bob-
troyer-issues-statement-regarding-marijuana-prosecutions-colorado [https://perma.cc/72K6-A9ZH] 
(“The United States Attorney’s Office in Colorado has already been guided by these principles [of 
federal prosecution as reiterated in Sessions’ rescission of the Cole Memorandum] in marijuana pros-
ecutions . . . . We will, consistent with the Attorney General’s latest guidance, continue to take this 
approach in all of our work with our law enforcement partners throughout Colorado.”) (emphasis 
added); Memorandum from Billy J. Williams, U.S. Att’y for the Dist. of Or. (May 18, 2018) [herein-
after Memorandum from Billy J. Williams], http://media.oregonlive.com/marijuana/other/2018/05/18/
USAOR-Marijuana%20Enforcement%20Priorities-Final%20(1).pdf (describing priorities for federal 
marijuana prosecution post-Cole Memorandum that are nearly identical to those in the Cole Memo-
randum). 
 193 See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2018) (making it a criminal offense for any person acting under color of 
any law to willfully deprive a person “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by 
the Constitution or laws of the United States”); 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2018) (giving the DOJ authority to 
initiate a civil action against any governmental authority demonstrating a “pattern or practice of con-
duct . . . that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Consti-
tution or laws of the United States”). 
 194 See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, Police Reform: Does Anything Work?, NEW YORKER (May 12, 2015), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/what-should-police-reform-look-like [https://perma.
cc/CN44-XGWQ] (describing Baltimore mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake’s political calculus in re-
questing a federal audit of Baltimore Police Department and recommendations for reform); Simone 
Weichselbaum, The Problems with Policing the Police, TIME (2019), http://time.com/police-shootings-
justice-department-civil-rights-investigations/ [https://perma.cc/NLH2-GG6K] (noting requests by the 
mayors of Phoenix, Arizona and Cleveland, Ohio for federal investigation and oversight of the Mari-
copa County Sheriff’s Office and the Cleveland Police Department, respectively). 
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In this way, increased federal investigation and oversight of local police 
departments during the Obama Administration195 contributed to a cascading 
political dynamic: growing public attention to, and concern about, civil rights 
violations within local police departments;196 growing dissatisfaction with a 
lack of progress in this area (notwithstanding the increase in federal interven-
tion and oversight);197 and, in turn, growing political pressure on local officials 
to make their police departments more accountable.198 It seems also to have 
mobilized the Fraternal Order of Police to change this political dynamic, by 
supporting a Presidential candidate who promised to the rank-and-file that he 
would be “on your side 1,000 percent . . . .”199 
A similar dynamic has emerged at the intersection of criminal law and 
immigration, where federal attempts to control local enforcement of federal 
immigration laws have heightened political attention to those issues. The most-
ly successful federal challenge to Arizona’s “Support Our Law Enforcement 
                                                                                                                           
 195 See Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189, 
3228–35 (2014); Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Timothy Williams, Obama Races to Overhaul Police in Bal-
timore and Chicago Before Trump Era, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
01/10/us/police-racial-bias-baltimore-chicago-obama-trump.html [https://perma.cc/M9EH-VQPP]. 
 196 Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards, De-Policing, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 721, 753 (2017) 
(“[P]ublic § 14141 investigations are destabilizing incidents within targeted communities that expose 
the affected police departments to added public distrust and negative interactions.”); see Weichsel-
baum, supra note 194 (observing how pattern and practice investigations have “raised public expecta-
tions” on police reform). This is not to say that federal intervention was the primary driver of in-
creased public attention to policing problems, but rather that the federal reports and consent decrees 
issued have given the public both a deeper understanding of the scope of those problems, and the 
impetus to fix them. 
 197 See Toobin, supra note 194 (describing growing public frustration with the seeming inability 
of both federal and local officials to fix intractable policing problems); Weichselbaum, supra note 194 
(“[A]s the Obama administration has ratcheted up its oversight of state and local law-enforcement 
agencies . . . questions about the effectiveness of those interventions have also been on the rise.”). 
 198 For instance, a scathing DOJ report on the Ferguson, Missouri Police Department forced the 
resignations of the city’s city manager and police chief. See generally CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (2015), https://www.justice.
gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.
pdf. Following the release of the DOJ’s report on the Chicago Police Department and a video of a 
police shooting of teenager Laquan McDonald, Mayor Rahm Emanuel announced he would not seek a 
third term, a decision many people attribute to the political pressure on him arising from those inci-
dents. See Alex Kotlowitz, What the Trial of Laquan McDonald’s Killer Means for the Future of 
Chicago, NEW YORKER (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/what-the-jason-
van-dyke-murder-trial-means-for-the-future-of-chicago [https://perma.cc/X4HW-SS3N]. 
 199 See Michael Zoorob, Blue Endorsements Matter: How the Fraternal Order of Police Contrib-
uted to Donald Trump’s Victory, PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 1, 2, 5–6 (Nov. 23, 2018) (finding a statistical-
ly significant association between the shift in GOP vote share from 2012 to 2016 in counties with 
large Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) presence and the FOP’s enthusiastic endorsement of Donald 
Trump in the 2016 U.S. presidential election as compared to its non-endorsement in the 2012 U.S. 
presidential election, and finding greater levels of political engagement by police officers in 2016 as 
compared to 2012). 
2020] Democracy, Bureaucracy, and Criminal Justice Reform 573 
and Safe Neighborhoods Act,”200 in which the Supreme Court struck down Ar-
izona’s attempt to criminally prosecute undocumented immigrants under state 
law,201 crystalized the role of the federal government—and thus the importance 
of national-level elections—in setting immigration policy. This clash between 
sovereigns (a number of states had passed similar laws, struck down in line 
with the Supreme Court’s decision) promptly moved from the courts to the 
political arena, where immigration policy took center stage in the next Presi-
dential election.202 Likewise, the federal government’s attempts—under both 
the Obama and Trump Administrations—to secure local law enforcement co-
operation in the apprehension of undocumented immigrants with criminal rec-
ords,203 has in turn made willingness to refuse cooperation with federal immi-
gration authorities a pivotal issue in a number of municipal elections.204 
Finally, federal courts are beginning to play a greater role in systemic po-
lice oversight, as distinguished from the retail oversight of adjudicating habeas 
petitions arising from state prosecutions and suppression motions in federal 
                                                                                                                           
 200 S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010). 
 201 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012). 
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deportation of violent felons became a lightning rod in the mayoral campaign); Sarah Ihlefeld et al., 
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www.newmexiconewsport.com/abq-mayoral-candidates-offer-contrasting-solutions/ [https://perma.
cc/3BUL-LD96] (discussing mayoral candidates’ competing views on “key issues,” among them 
whether to declare Albuquerque a sanctuary city); Joshua Stewart, Sanctuary Lawsuit Helps Define 
Where County Supervisor Candidates Stand on Immigration, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Apr. 12, 
2018), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/politics/sd-me-immigration-stance-20180413-
story.html [https://perma.cc/C4YY-PG3D] (describing the San Diego county Board of Supervisors’ 
“looming decision” about whether to join the federal government in its lawsuit challenging California 
laws that limit local police cooperation with federal immigration officials as “a litmus test for candi-
dates running in this year’s election for the Board of Supervisors”). For a list of the more than three 
hundred municipalities identifying as “sanctuary cities,” see Bryan Griffith & Jessica M. Vaughan, 
Map: Sanctuary Cities, Counties, and States, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUD. (Apr. 16, 2019), https://
cis.org/Map-Sanctuary-Cities-Counties-and-States [https://perma.cc/QW4T-YBA8]. 
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criminal cases involving local police. In at least two recent examples, federal 
courts in New York City and Philadelphia were called on to assess the constitu-
tionality of police stop and frisk practices on a systemic level, by way of class 
actions filed on behalf of aggrieved citizens.205 As with other instances of fed-
eral oversight over local law enforcement, these cases made local policing 
practices more politically salient. Following the case filings and the media at-
tention generated from them, mayoral elections in both cities focused heavily 
on the candidates’ positions on stop and frisk—with the ultimately victorious 
candidates campaigning heavily on vows to reform their police departments’ 
practices.206 In New York, political pressure precipitated by the class action 
also generated immediate response by local leaders: the city council passed 
new police oversight legislation, and the police department began taking steps 
to reduce police stops.207 The political fallout from these lawsuits may ulti-
mately have had a greater impact on police stop and frisk practices than the 
judicial decrees issued in the cases themselves.208 
                                                                                                                           
 205 See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Bailey v. City of Phila-
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 206 See Barbaro & Chen, supra note 89; Dwyer, supra note 89; Anna Orso, Jim Kenney Wins: 
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 208 In New York, stops and frisks plummeted in 2012, before the trial court’s August 2013 deci-
sion and ruling in the case. See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540; Ruderman, supra note 207. In Philadelph-
ia, a consent decree had little initial effect on the number of illegal stops and frisks; only after the 
election of a new mayor (who had campaigned heavily on eliminating illegal stop and frisk practices) 
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See Plaintiffs’ Ninth Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices: Fourth Amendment 
Issues at 1, 3, Bailey, 2009 WL 10700082 (C.A. No. 10-5952), https://www.aclupa.org/sites/default/
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III. MANAGING TRANSITIONAL MOMENTS IN A BLENDED SYSTEM 
The foregoing is an account of tension: between shifting public prefer-
ences on criminal justice, the political structures through which those prefer-
ences are channeled, the goals and interests of politically accountable en-
forcement leaders and career-level enforcers, and the divergent roles and con-
stituencies of different sovereigns within the criminal justice arena. These ten-
sions help explain, in part, why the first decades of the 21st century have seen 
a palpable shift in public preferences on criminal justice coupled with relative-
ly limited changes to criminal enforcement on the ground. 
I say in part; it is true, to be sure, that public preferences have not shifted 
nearly as far as necessary to generate substantial reductions in the U.S. prison 
population, nearly half of which is comprised of violent offenders.209 But re-
ductions in penal populations are not, and should not be, our only metric for 
successful reform. Other metrics, more closely tied to shifting public prefer-
ences—for instance, the frequency and nature of police/citizen contact, the 
number of low-level, non-violent drug offenders prosecuted or imprisoned for 
mandatory terms, or the number of non-violent, indigent defendants required 
to post cash bail—are also important indicators of a criminal justice system’s 
health. And unlike the public shifts required to substantially reduce prison 
populations, much of the public already supports, by large measures, reforms 
to street policing, drug enforcement, and cash bail.210 The failure to accomplish 
genuine reductions in penal populations is one story worth telling.211 The slow 
pace at which other, more popular criminal justice reforms have taken root 
within enforcement institutions is a different story, one in which the tension 
between democracy and bureaucracy plays an important and under-studied 
role. 
That tension, in turn, raises an important normative question. What is the 
ideal role of enforcement institutions at moments of political transition in crim-
inal justice? Is the foregoing account a story of democratic subversion? Or is it 
something else—something more nuanced, and perhaps even desirable in some 
respects? This Part considers these questions, arguing that the very features of 
enforcement bureaucracies that depress change at moments of political transi-
tion can, properly leveraged, advance democratic ideals of participation and 
deliberation. 
                                                                                                                           
 209 See Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON POLI-
CY INITIATIVE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html [https://perma.cc/
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 210 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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A. Balancing Responsiveness and Resistance 
Imagining the ideal role of enforcement institutions at moments of politi-
cal transition begs an antecedent question as to the ideal role of the public. 
More specifically: to what extent do we wish the enforcement bureaucracy to 
be entirely responsive to political shifts, particularly as those shifts manifest in 
election outcomes? 
The foregoing exploration into criminal justice “publics” and voter choice 
should at least give us pause before demanding full political responsiveness 
from the enforcement bureaucracy.212 Yes, defining crimes and their punish-
ment is an intensely normative task that is, in theory, best suited to the com-
munity and its politically accountable leaders.213 But as we have seen, concepts 
of community and political accountability in criminal justice are not so easily 
realized. Criminal justice “communities” are malleable, in constant flux and 
realignment.214 Criminal justice preferences are not easily interpreted through 
voter choice,215 particularly at the state and national levels where penal laws 
are enacted.216 The democracy of the electoral sphere, even in (and perhaps 
especially in) moments of political transition, does not clearly translate the 
many nuances and varieties of public preferences on criminal justice. 
At the same time, there are significant drawbacks to ceding too much 
power to entrenched institutional interests to set the enforcement agenda. Giv-
en that the enforcement status quo is inevitably the product of political choices 
made at an earlier time, bureaucratic resistance among law enforcement is not 
quite the apolitical ideal its practitioners might believe it to be.217 Moreover, as 
participants in a system, enforcers are handicapped by a natural tendency to 
justify it.218 Add to this a reflexive resistance to public influence219 exacerbated 
by the presence of multiple sovereigns answering to different constituencies in 
a given criminal enforcement space,220 and the capacity of enforcement bu-
reaucracies to engage in neutral, informed, and responsive decision making 
seems limited at best. 
There are, in short, inherent limits to both the public’s and the enforce-
ment bureaucracy’s capacities to craft a reasoned, publicly supported criminal 
enforcement agenda. And so perhaps the tensions explored here are features, 
                                                                                                                           
 212 See supra Part II.A. 
 213 See generally BIBAS, supra note 19. 
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 219 See supra Parts II.B & C.1. 
 220 See supra Part II.C.2. 
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rather than bugs, of the democracy/bureaucracy relationship. These features 
insulate criminal enforcement from the hazards of conflicting, muddled, and 
unstable popular sentiment, while at the same time protecting the system from 
unbridled enforcer discretion. 
There are also, counterintuitively, features of bureaucratic resistance in 
the criminal enforcement space that amplify rather than suppress public partic-
ipation in criminal justice. For instance, bureaucratic resistance demands that 
elected leaders not only advance a criminal enforcement agenda approved by a 
majority of voters, but that they convince the professional enforcement appa-
ratus of the benefits of such an agenda. The push and pull that ensues in that 
process demands and sustains greater public investment, both to ensure that the 
elected leader presses the agenda, and that she succeeds in operationalizing it. 
Thus, in jurisdictions that have elected more progressive prosecutors, commu-
nity and civil society groups are taking a more active role in evaluating the 
extent of progress on promised reforms.221 Likewise, cooperation between en-
forcement institutions across different jurisdictions and sovereigns may help 
shield enforcers, to some degree, from the accounting of their constituents; but 
federalism can also, as we have seen, help propel particular criminal enforce-
ment issues to the political fore, giving those issues greater visibility and pur-
chase in the public sphere. Further, criminal enforcers report to multiple prin-
cipals across different jurisdictions. This dynamic guards against too much 
control by any single political constituency, giving voice to a greater diversity 
of viewpoints. Under this conception, the enforcement bureaucracy plays nei-
ther the role of democracy-subversive222 nor democracy-booster.223 It is less 
definitive, and, perhaps, more malleable. 
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The question that remains, then, is the extent to which we might leverage 
this role to generate more reasoned, legitimate criminal enforcement. Here, I 
draw on concepts of deliberative democracy.224 As the foregoing analysis has 
demonstrated, elections, even at the local level, are a necessary but insufficient 
mechanism of translating the diverse, complicated, and unstable viewpoints 
that characterize public preferences on criminal justice.225 The rise in recent 
years of extra-electoral citizen involvement in criminal justice—through social 
justice movements,226 citizen lobbying,227 and community intervention in pro-
cesses such as bail228 and police stops229—is in many ways a response to that 
void. Although these mechanisms of citizen involvement have benefits, they 
also have significant limitations. Among them is the limited capacity of contes-
tation and agonism from without enforcement bureaucracies to engender sys-
temic change within them.230 As the foregoing analysis has shown, shifts in 
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enforcement on the ground ultimately require the assent not only of citizens, 
but also of enforcement leaders and line enforcers. 
Assent to change is a process, and the enforcement bureaucracy plays a 
critical role in it. The collective discretionary decisions of front-line enforcers, 
over time, calibrate how shifts in public preferences manifest in shifts in crim-
inal law-on-the-ground. That calibration should be a deliberative process, one 
in which both citizens and front-line enforcers take part. 
What might such a process look like? The following Section offers a ten-
tative sketch. 
B. The Enforcement Bureaucracy and the Deliberative Ideal 
This Section proposes three typologies of mechanisms to increase delib-
eration and communication between the enforcement bureaucracy and the pub-
lic, as well as between enforcement leaders and career enforcers: mechanisms 
constructed around (1) hearing and responding to public preferences;231 (2) 
hearing and responding to career enforcers;232 and (3) aligning the interests of 
enforcement leaders, career enforcers, and the public.233 
1. Hearing and Responding to Public Preferences 
Deliberative mechanisms would ideally open a dialogue between the en-
forcement bureaucracy and the various communities of interest that comprise 
the criminal justice public.234 This would enable enforcement institutions to 
hear a fuller, more diverse composition of public preferences, outside the mud-
dled messaging of elections or the intense passions of social movements. 
Greater use of issue-specific polling, for instance, would cut through the noise 
of issue-proliferation and bypass the contortions of partisanship and negative 
partisanship. More robust use of commissions and advisory councils could bet-
ter reflect the multiple communities of interest that comprise the criminal jus-
tice “public”—community groups, special interest groups (victims, families of 
those arrested or incarcerated, educators, and the like)—and importantly, could 
open a direct line of dialogue between those groups and the groups that com-
prise the enforcement bureaucracy. 
Stakeholder dialogues, in fact, have already proven successful in helping 
public officials craft more broadly supported criminal justice policies. In Ore-
                                                                                                                           
problems,” which are requisites for actual governance as opposed to “further contestation”). For fur-
ther discussion, see supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text. 
 231 See infra notes 234–246. 
 232 See infra notes 247–258. 
 233 See infra notes 259–271. 
 234 See supra Part I.A. 
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gon, for instance, the U.S. Attorney used this approach to help guide the exer-
cise of federal enforcement discretion of marijuana once it had been legalized 
by statewide referendum.235 A day-long summit convened more than 130 peo-
ple representing a variety of institutional interests and stakeholders, and aired a 
diversity of views—and yet the participants were able to reach agreement on a 
number of principles to guide both state regulation and federal enforcement 
discretion.236 In New York City, Mayor Bill de Blasio has formed a task force 
comprised of a variety of stakeholders to help reduce the population of New 
Yorkers in city jails and ultimately close Rikers Island.237 In comparison to the 
Mayor’s mixed record on policing reform—where he has made scant efforts to 
bring together stakeholders238—he has demonstrated concrete successes in his 
promised efforts to reduce city jail populations.239 And in Chicago, former 
Mayor Rahm Emanuel has attributed success in the city’s most recent police 
reform efforts to a deliberative reform process, in which community stakehold-
ers and focus groups of rank-and-file police officers have participated, along 
with Police Department leadership (in addition to the Illinois Attorney General 
and a federal judge, for reforms arising from a federal consent decree).240 
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Successful dialogic processes must be designed to generate genuine rather 
than perfunctory participation. Research into formalized community-police 
meetings conducted by the Chicago Police Board, for instance, has demon-
strated that processes intended to generate dialogue can themselves be loci of 
bureaucratic resistance, further reinforcing rather than reforming the status 
quo.241 Elected and appointed leaders (mayors, chief prosecutors, and police 
commissioners) must therefore take care to design processes that generate 
genuine dialogue rather than occasions for each side simply to revert to defen-
sive scripts.242 For instance, the Chicago Police Board’s public community 
meetings were designed to permit any citizen to voice complaints or con-
cerns.243 The process was thus constructed around citizen complaints for past 
enforcement action or inaction, and invited sporadic, unaccountable participa-
tion by both sides—that is, various community members could (and did) enter 
and leave the discussion, and police representatives had no mandate or di-
rective to respond and propose concrete reforms.244 
A more productive process, such as that used to generate a federal consent 
decree between the Chicago Police Department and the Illinois Attorney Gen-
eral, would be constructed around generating consensus-based, forward-
looking reforms. It would have defined parameters for participation, draw on 
experts to facilitate deliberation using evidence-based practices, and make par-
ticipants and facilitators accountable for producing concrete reform pro-
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 244 See Cheng, supra note 241, at 14 & 15 fig.2 (observing that many members of the public who 
came to speak at meetings were “one-timers,” not returning to subsequent meetings); see also Public 
Meetings of the Police Board, supra note 243. 
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posals.245 And in fora with entrenched distrust between communities and en-
forcers, a successful process might jettison direct dialogue in favor of separate 
feedback processes, which can collectively communicate community and en-
forcer perspectives without precipitating each group’s reversion to scripts.246 
2. Hearing and Responding to Career Enforcers 
We can also imagine means of managing and even leveraging internal re-
sistance within enforcement institutions at transitional moments in ways that 
enhance democracy. The reformist prosecutors who have had the most trouble 
advancing public demands for change are those who enlarge the distance be-
tween themselves and the career enforcers they lead, whether by isolating 
themselves from their employees, firing (or forcing the resignations of) a good 
portion of them, or both.247 Likewise, the reformist police commissioners who 
have had the most trouble translating new policies through the rank-and-file 
are those perceived as out of touch with the interests and concerns of beat 
                                                                                                                           
 245 See CONSENT DECREE COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT, supra note 240, at 8–10 (describing facili-
tator expertise and methodology); OPINIONS OF CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS, supra note 240, at 6–7 
(citing U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
GAINING CONSENSUS AMONG STAKEHOLDERS THROUGH THE NOMINAL GROUP TECHNIQUE (2018), 
https://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/evaluation/pdf/brief7.pdf) (describing the overall methodology and 
the use of Nominal Group Technique to generate consensus). 
 246 This was, in fact, the approach of the community and officer engagement initiative leading up 
to the adoption of the Chicago Police Department’s consent decree: community members and police 
officers had separate feedback sessions, which were then each publicly reported in detail and consid-
ered in the formulation of the consent decree. See CONSENT DECREE COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT, 
supra note 240; OPINIONS OF CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS, supra note 240. 
 247 See Keri Blakinger, High Turnover Continues at Harris County DA’s Office, HOUS. CHRON. 
(Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/High-turnover-
continues-at-Harris-County-DA-s-13779505.php [https://perma.cc/P9HD-EYMA] (describing low mo-
rale and lack of leadership in office of newly elected top prosecutor for Harris County, Texas, following 
firing and forced resignations of forty prosecutors and subsequent high turnover); Jennifer Gonnerman, 
Larry Krasner’s Campaign to End Mass Incarceration, NEW YORKER (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/29/larry-krasners-campaign-to-end-mass-incarceration?reload=true
&reload=true&reload=true [https://perma.cc/4U8C-F4Y5] (describing the firings and forced resigna-
tions of thirty-one prosecutors following the election of Larry Krasner as the Philadelphia District 
Attorney, and a tense office culture in which new hires and longtime employees are at odds); Doyle 
Murphy, Elected as a Progressive Reformer, Kim Gardner’s First 21 Months Have Featured Chaos 
and Conflict, RIVERFRONT TIMES (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.riverfronttimes.com/stlouis/kim-
gardner-was-elected-as-a-progressive-reformer-but-her-first-21-months-have-featured-chaos-and-
conflict/Content?oid=24218560 [https://perma.cc/74Y6-BZAB] (describing, in a profile of newly 
elected top prosecutor for St. Louis, Missouri, firings, forced resignations, and new policies developed 
with former campaign aides behind closed doors); Palmer, supra note 157 (describing Philadelphia 
District Attorney Larry Krasner’s revamping of his office’s homicide policies without consultation 
with line homicide prosecutors, and in one instance pushing out a prosecutor who disagreed with how 
Krasner’s deputy directed her to handle a case). 
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cops.248 The leaders who appear to make the greatest efforts to translate voters’ 
desires into policies end up alienating the professionals through whom polices 
get implemented, while those more attendant to the enforcement bureaucracy 
end up alienating the voters who elected them.249 
The divide between leaders and enforcers need not lead inexorably to 
these results. In fact, it could lead to greater public and bureaucratic participa-
tion in setting the enforcement agenda. Here, too, dialogic pathways are criti-
cal. Career enforcers should be represented in the multi-stakeholder commis-
sions discussed above (and by career enforcers, I mean not just supervisors and 
sergeants, but most critically line prosecutors and patrol officers). Such repre-
sentation will help communicate public preferences, and the reasons for those 
preferences, directly to those in the position to advance them through the daily 
exercise of enforcement discretion. A dialogue between career enforcers and 
the public they serve may also help erode the tendency towards system justifi-
cation. Participation in the process itself will give career enforcers, like their 
leaders, dual citizenship: they will be active participants not just in the criminal 
justice system, but also the democratic system of governance. More practically, 
being forced to articulate to a public audience of diverse interests and com-
mitments the precise reasons an existing practice is necessary or beneficial will 
force enforcers to grapple with the practice’s continuing use. It may also help 
enforcers see that practice less as an apolitical enforcement tool, and more as a 
product of earlier political choices. 
By the same token, dialogic pathways do, and should, run in two direc-
tions. Career enforcers’ views are in some respects biased by their motivations, 
interests, and internal justifications, but their views are also deeply informed 
by professional experience and expertise lacking among the lay public. Just as 
career enforcers can stand to learn from lay stakeholders, so, too, can lay 
stakeholders learn from enforcers. Such a dialogue can further enrich the de-
liberative process necessary for reasoned policy making in a democracy. 
                                                                                                                           
 248 See, e.g., Weichselbaum, supra note 120 (describing reform-minded former Baltimore police 
commissioner’s “lack [of] street cred with the cops under his command” and positing that this may 
have led to his firing). 
 249 See Steve Bogira, The Hustle of Kim Foxx, MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.
themarshallproject.org/2018/10/29/the-hustle-of-kim-foxx [https://perma.cc/WT6T-CDB6] (describ-
ing the tensions between Cook County State’s Attorney Kim Foxx and some area police chiefs, police 
union officials, and judges on the one hand, and progressive organizers who helped her win election 
on the other); Azi Paybarah, What Bill Bratton Changed in 990 Days at the NYPD, POLITICO (Sept. 16, 
2016), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall/story/2016/09/what-bill-bratton-changed-in-
990-days-at-the-nypd-105552 [https://perma.cc/MR8Y-W2J2] (describing how NYC Mayor de Blasio’s 
decision to appoint as police commissioner William Bratton, who first operationalized the now widely 
criticized zero-tolerance policing model, disappointed many of the groups who worked to elect him). 
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Another dialogic pathway lies in the internal lines of authority. Leaders 
elected or appointed on a reform platform should take care to elevate career 
servants to senior-level advisory positions alongside newcomers from the out-
side. Such a move sends a message to the office that career servants, and their 
opinions, are valued.250 It also opens a line of communication between new 
leaders and office or department employees. Leaders can learn from aides how 
their policy changes are being received, and aides can help leaders in turn 
market those changes to the office.251 Other means of giving career servants 
voice and agency in a transition—such as commissioning surveys, or setting 
up committees comprised of new and veteran servants—can also fuel buy-in 
and thereby catalyze change.252 The procedural justice literature over the last 
few years has accumulated evidence of the positive effect of enhancing proce-
dural justice within police departments: when officers feel they have voice and 
are treated fairly, and that department leadership is accountable and transpar-
ent, they are more inclined to disseminate those values externally to the com-
munities they police.253 
Of course, some organizations require radical change. But achieving radi-
cal change is different from achieving radical disruption. One can hardly fire 
one’s way to reform. For one thing, it can backfire; just ask former New Orle-
                                                                                                                           
 250 Kim Foxx, for instance, rattled career prosecutors in her office by the appointment of a leader-
ship team devoid of a single office veteran. See Bogira, supra note 249 (“The veterans had heard Foxx 
criticize the office and its practices during her campaign—and after she won the primary, they’d had 
nine months to stew about the approaching regime change. The staff wasn’t calmed when Foxx named 
her executive team. None of the seven had worked a day in the office.”). 
 251 Bill Bratton did this when he was brought in to turn around the New York City Police De-
partment in the 1990s, and his success was attributed to his ability to achieve buy-in from the rank-
and-file. See W. Chan Kim & Renee Mauborgne, Tipping Point Leadership, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 
2003), https://hbr.org/2003/04/tipping-point-leadership [https://perma.cc/6GHG-2CN4]. That he did 
not tackle the very different problems facing the same police department in the second decade of the 
21st century says less about his leadership style and more about his individual commitment to the 
reforms being sought. See Paybarah, supra note 249 (“Bratton took [progressive police reformers’] 
plans, smiled, and spent the next 990 days either watering down the proposals or flat-out opposing 
them.”). 
 252 In Chicago, for instance, State’s Attorney Kim Foxx brought in an outside consultant to con-
duct an anonymous survey of career prosecutors’ views on the office and suggestions for improve-
ment. Interestingly, once asked for their opinion, office veterans—initially wary of Foxx and disposed 
against change—acknowledged the need for change and showed interest in learning about alternative 
approaches. See Bogira, supra note 249. The simple act of giving them voice encouraged career pros-
ecutors to consider why change might be good, and how it could be achieved. See id. 
 253 See, e.g., Ben Bradford et al., Why Do ‘The Law’ Comply? Procedural Justice, Group Identi-
fication and Officer Motivation in Police Organizations, 11 EUR. J. CRIM. 110 (2014); Rick Trinkner 
et al., Justice from Within: The Relations Between a Procedurally Just Organizational Climate and 
Police Organizational Efficiency, Endorsement of Democratic Policing, and Officer Well-Being, 22 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 158, 167 (2016) (“Officers were more likely to endorse a community 
model of policing incorporating procedurally just tactics and reject excessive use of force to the extent 
that they believed their organization treated them fairly.”). 
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ans District Attorney Eddie Jordan.254 But even for those elected prosecutors 
who demonstrate greater savvy in handling large-scale dismissals, the down-
sides are manifest: poor morale among those who remain and a dearth of expe-
rience, particularly at the upper ranks.255 Outside large cities, replenishing le-
gal talent is hard to do. And dismissals are not even an option in institutions 
where career servants have civil service or union-negotiated protection, as is 
the case in most police departments and even some district attorneys’ offices. 
What’s more, radical disruption can have cascading and counter-
productive effects. As the foregoing analysis makes clear, local law enforce-
ment institutions are not silos; they are embedded in a network of inter- and 
intra-jurisdictional relationships. Office stalwarts pushed out by a newly elect-
ed leader are therefore likely to end up at a neighboring enforcement institu-
tion, where they bring the very orientation deemed objectionable at their home 
institution. Indeed, this is precisely what has happened to a number of the 
ADAs pushed out by Philadelphia’s new District Attorney, Larry Krasner.256 
And as new reformist leaders come to power, the rank-and-file, having ob-
served regime change in other jurisdictions, are beginning to take proactive steps 
to shore up their power against an agenda they perceive as threatening.257 These 
efforts, if successful, can end up impeding the very reforms voters seek.258 
                                                                                                                           
 254 See Gwen Filosa & Laura Maggi, DA Eddie Jordan Resigns, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE 
(Oct. 30, 2007), https://web.archive.org/web/20180616200259/http://blog.nola.com/times-picayune/
2007/10/sources_talks_underway_for_jor.html [https://perma.cc/Q5G4-BNEU] (describing the once 
reform-touting DA’s fall from grace, after firing fifty-six ADAs, which, on top of triggering a success-
ful suit by the ousted prosecutors for racial discrimination, “had the effect of stripping the office of 
institutional knowledge and experienced talent, throwing its daily management into confusion and 
setting off a trend of poor working conditions and chronic turnover”). Jordan’s resulting inability to 
successfully prosecute violent crime ultimately led to the election of a more tough-on-crime prosecu-
tor. 
 255 See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
 256 See Ryan Briggs, Year of Uncertainty Sees Top Philly DA Staffers Flee to AG Shapiro, CITY 
& STATE PA. (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.cityandstatepa.com/content/year-uncertainty-sees-top-
philly-da-staffers-flee-ag-shapiro [https://perma.cc/R53M-CQDE] (reporting that nearly half of the 
dismissed ADAs from the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office have taken positions at the State 
Attorney General’s Office). 
 257 See Tony Messenger, St. Louis County Prosecutors Seek to Join Police Union Before Wesley 
Bell Takes Over, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Dec. 16, 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/
columns/tony-messenger/messenger-st-louis-county-prosecutors-seek-to-join-police-union/article_
f489d57d-a6a2-5a95-a4c2-44dab7d73767.html [https://perma.cc/ZEU5-D4DE] (describing efforts by 
ADAs in St. Louis County, Missouri, to join the police union following the defeat of long-time Prose-
cuting Attorney Bob McCulloch, who was heavily backed by the police union in his fight against the 
ultimately victorious reformist prosecutor Wesley Bell). 
 258 See id. (discussing how prosecutors’ membership in police unions creates a conflict when 
prosecutors investigate police). The St. Louis County Prosecuting Attorney race was widely seen as a 
referendum on McCulloch’s position vis-à-vis prosecution of police use of force, including most fa-
mously with his decision not to charge Darren Wilson in the death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, 
Missouri. See Joel Currier, Wesley Bell Ousts Longtime St. Louis County Prosecuting Attorney, ST. 
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All of this is not to say that reformist leaders should slow-walk change to 
appease resistant subordinates. It is simply to suggest that durable reform re-
quires, among other things, curbing resistance in the first place. That process, 
and all the difficult dialogic work it entails, can end up enhancing communal 
and bureaucratic participation in criminal enforcement. 
3. Aligning Interests 
Finally, we should imagine mechanisms that better align the interests and 
motivations of career enforcers with those of enforcement leaders, and with the 
public.259 One such mechanism is performance evaluation. Elsewhere I have 
discussed at length how performance measures can impact the exercise of en-
forcement discretion.260 For leaders seeking to shift line enforcers’ exercise of 
discretion, then, performance measures can be a far more effective tool than 
persuasion on the merits. A key reason for the explosion of citizen stops and 
frisks in New York during the early 2000s—between 2002 and 2010, stops in-
creased sixfold, from just under 100,000 to over 600,000—was the use of per-
precinct stops as a new evaluative metric for precinct captains.261 This, in turn, 
put intense pressure on patrol officers to make more stops.262 Changing the 
performance measure to something more aligned with public demands likely 
reduced the frequency of stops: once the police department began linking pre-
                                                                                                                           
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/wesley-
bell-ousts-longtime-st-louis-county-prosecuting-attorney/article_5b2134b8-f204-5e20-9572-e59cacbb
0aed.html [https://perma.cc/8XXJ-K7A3] (“‘Ferguson defined this election’ . . . . [Bell] ran for the 
prosecutor’s job on a reform platform and pledged to put a new face on criminal justice in St. Louis 
County. McCulloch’s opponents, particularly in the Brown case, had portrayed him as too friendly to 
law enforcement, given his family ties to police.”). 
 259 See generally supra Part II.B.2. 
 260 See Ouziel, supra note 28 (discussing how federal criminal enforcement agencies, such as the 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and USAOs, are evaluated by Congress in large part on the 
basis of numbers of arrests, indictments, and convictions, and how this steers enforcement to lower-
hanging fruit). 
 261 See Chris Smith, The Controversial Crime-Fighting Program That Changed Big-City Policing 
Forever, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/03/the-crime-fighting-program-
that-changed-new-york-forever.html [https://perma.cc/G83K-5QMH]. 
 262 See First Report of the Independent Monitor at 64, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 
F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 1:08CV01034), http://nypdmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/08/MonitorsFirstReport-AsFiledInFloydDocket.pdf (“In many meetings with NYPD officials 
and officers at every rank and from many different units, the Department has acknowledged, as the 
court found, that an excessive focus on ‘numbers’ led to the overuse and misuse of ‘stop, question and 
frisk.’ This emphasis was included in the evaluation of officers as part of periodic reviews and in less 
formal ways. The push for more and more stops (along with other enforcement activities) was in-
grained in the expectations of supervisors at every level and of officers on the street. The result was 
less focus on the lawfulness and effectiveness of individual stops and more on increasing the number 
of stops.”). 
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cinct captain performance evaluation to quality (legality and efficacy of stops) 
rather than quantity, the number of stops plummeted.263 
Performance measures are by no means a failsafe tool for modulating en-
forcement discretion. They will not necessarily be impactful among line en-
forcers whose long-term interests lie in the private sector, an arena with its 
own performance measures that enforcement leaders are powerless to 
change.264 More critically, internal performance measures can be circum-
scribed by competing external (that is, public) measures. As the New York City 
Police Department’s use of stop and frisk declined, crime continued to decline, 
as well.265 Had crime risen, Department leadership likely would have felt pres-
sure to resume aggressive use of stop and frisk, a tactic that had coincided with 
the reduction in the city’s crime rate.266 
It is external performance pressures, for example, that have most likely 
limited the internal bail reform directives by some elected prosecutors.267 Alt-
hough these prosecutors campaigned on a promise to reduce the use of cash 
bail and have directed subordinates to recommend that courts release low-risk 
defendants on their own recognizance, such recommendations can easily be 
offered half-heartedly, or not at all.268 This is not entirely surprising given that 
                                                                                                                           
 263 See Annual Stop-and-Frisk Numbers, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION [hereinafter NYCLU 
STOP-AND-FRISK NUMBERS], https://www.nyclu.org/en/stop-and-frisk-data [https://perma.cc/TP86-
WE3Y] (compiling and summarizing NYPD’s data on its stops and frisks from 2002 to the first half 
of 2019); Letter from Raymond W. Kelly, N.Y.C. Police Comm’r, to Hon. Christine Quinn, Speaker, 
N.Y.C. Council (May 16, 2012), https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/
05/17/nyregion/17stopandfrisk.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4EJU-VYM5] (outlining changes to the 
Department’s stop and frisk program, including ongoing precinct captain audits of stop and frisk 
worksheets (reports by patrol officers detailing the circumstances of each stop made) for compliance 
with department guidelines, followed by Chief of Department review of worksheets prior to meetings 
with precinct Captains to ensure quality). 
 264 See supra notes 122–129 and accompanying text. 
 265 Compare NYCLU STOP-AND-FRISK NUMBERS, supra note 263 (reporting a steep decline in 
stops and frisks between 2011 and 2019), with N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, SEVEN MAJOR FELONY OF-
FENSES [hereinafter SEVEN MAJOR FELONY OFFENSES], https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/
pdf/analysis_and_planning/historical-crime-data/seven-major-felony-offenses-2000-2017.pdf (report-
ing an overall decline in seven major categories of felony offenses between 2000 and 2017). 
 266 See NYCLU STOP-AND-FRISK NUMBERS, supra note 263 (reporting a steep decline in stops 
and frisks between 2011 and 2019); SEVEN MAJOR FELONY OFFENSES, supra note 265 (reporting an 
overall decline in seven major categories of felony offenses between 2000 and 2017). 
 267 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 268 See Ouss & Stevenson, supra note 30, at 19–20 (among defendants eligible under District 
Attorney’s policy for release on their own recognizance (ROR), finding that District Attorney’s office 
representative requested ROR for just 7% of eligible defendants; requested monetary conditions for 
release for 19% of eligible defendants; and declined to make any recommendation on conditions of 
release for 70% of eligible defendants); see also Bogira, supra note 249 (“[Kim Foxx had] heard that 
in bond court, when judges would testily ask prosecutors why they were recommending an I-bond, the 
prosecutors would sometimes respond, ‘Because it’s our new policy.’ She wished they’d instead tell 
the judge they were recommending an I-bond because an I-bond was appropriate.”). 
588 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:523 
such recommendations offer line prosecutors little upside. When a new internal 
performance metric (“reduce bond recommendations in certain cases”) comes 
up against a more foundational, enduring external metric (“keep the communi-
ty safe”), long-term professional preservation pushes prosecutors towards the 
latter. For line prosecutors, who bear the primary burden of their decisions on 
bail recommendations in a given case, misjudgment resulting in a defendant’s 
pre-trial detention is less risky than misjudgment resulting in additional 
crimes.269 
The contrast between Chicago State’s Attorney Kim Foxx’s success at re-
ducing low-level shoplifting cases and her relatively greater struggle to gener-
ate change in bail outcomes is a ready illustration of both the impact of per-
formance measurement and the challenges it poses.270 Foxx’s initiative to curb 
prosecutions of low-level shoplifting cases was successful in part because 
compliance with her directive was easy for supervisors to ensure and meas-
ure—charging instruments alleging less than $1,000 in losses had to charge 
misdemeanors rather than felonies271—and in part because the policy itself 
accorded with line prosecutors’ self-interest in focusing on higher-level cases. 
But her initiative to reduce cash bail has proven more difficult to execute. This 
is in part because line prosecutors’ compliance is hard to ensure and measure—
prosecutors can make arguments in bail hearings with varying levels of enthu-
siasm, and the ultimate bail decision rests with the judicial officer—and be-
cause, as discussed above, asking for a defendant to be released without bail is 
not always in line prosecutors’ self-interest.  
All of this is not to say that external metrics such as crime reduction and 
community safety are wrong; of course, they are not. Rather, it is to invite a 
discussion about the tradeoffs some desired changes require—of career enforc-
ers, politically accountable leaders, and ultimately, the public itself. In this 
                                                                                                                           
 269 See Carol Felsenthal, Kim Foxx Wants to Tell You a Story, CHI. MAG. (Dec. 10, 2018), http://
www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/January-2019/Kim-Foxx-Wants-to-Tell-You-a-Story/ 
[https://perma.cc/H2XB-6XT3] (observing Foxx’s frustration with the challenge of implementing 
promises on bail reform: “[y]ou get Willie Horton and then everybody is afraid to let someone out”). 
 270 See DEFENSE ATTORNEYS REPORT ON KIM FOXX’S PROGRESS, supra note 30 (describing 
mixed success with reducing cash bonds); EVALUATION OF KIM FOXX’S FIRST YEAR IN OFFICE, su-
pra note 30 (describing Foxx’s successes in reducing overcharging and challenges in implementing 
bail reform). Compare COOK COUNTY STATE’S ATTORNEY 2017 DATA REPORT (2018), https://www.
cookcountystatesattorney.org/sites/default/files/files/documents/ccsao_2017_data_report_180220.pdf 
(showing 1,883 felony retail theft cases filed in 2017, the first year in which the new policy applied), 
with COOK COUNTY STATE’S ATTORNEY 2016 DATA REPORT (2d ed. 2018), https://www.cookcounty
statesattorney.org/sites/default/files/files/documents/ccsao_2016_baseline_data_report.pdf (showing 
3,602 felony retail theft cases filed in 2016). 
 271 See Steve Schmadeke, Top Cook County Prosecutor Raising Bar for Charging Shoplifters 
with Felony, CHIC. TRIB. (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-
kim-foxx-retail-theft-1215-20161214-story.html [https://perma.cc/LUY9-R4TA]. 
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way, performance measures open another avenue of dialogue between the pub-
lic and the enforcement bureaucracy. Enforcement leaders can and should ar-
ticulate publicly the metrics they will use to evaluate line enforcers’ perfor-
mance; and members of the public can and should reflect on the extent of their 
willingness to shift their own evaluative metrics, too. 
CONCLUSION 
The first decades of the 21st century have seen a palpable shift in public 
preferences on criminal justice coupled with relatively limited change in the 
administration of criminal justice on the ground. Existing scholarship, largely 
reflective of an increasingly outdated political economy of criminal justice, 
tells us little about this paradox. This Article has sought to fill that gap, explor-
ing how a mix of institutional and political arrangements alternatively enables 
and impedes changes in enforcement on the ground. The political structures 
through which public preferences on criminal justice are channeled; the goals 
and interests of politically accountable enforcement leaders and career-level 
enforcers; and the effects of multiple sovereigns in a given criminal enforce-
ment space collectively complicate the translation of changing public prefer-
ences down through the enforcement bureaucracy. 
But the very features that complicate translation of changing preferences 
also open new pathways for enhancing greater participation in criminal justice 
administration. Conflicts between sovereigns in a given criminal enforcement 
space can bring greater public attention to and engagement with the issues 
fueling the conflict. The hard work of convincing enforcement professionals of 
the value of change necessarily requires greater public engagement outside the 
electoral process. Giving greater voice and participation to career enforcers in 
setting enforcement policy invites them to examine more critically the choices 
they make, and to see those choices as products of earlier political movements. 
Elected and appointed leaders should imagine mechanisms for greater en-
gagement by both career enforcers and the public in setting criminal enforce-
ment priorities and practices. Such mechanisms should be designed to encour-
age stakeholders—community leaders and representatives, those affected by 
crime and its enforcement, career enforcers, and enforcement leaders—to par-
ticipate in and deliberate on the exercise of enforcement discretion, and to en-
sure that agreed-upon reforms are implemented and executed. With thought, 
engagement, deliberation, and care, changing public preferences can be refined 
and translated into changed enforcement on the ground. 
  
 
